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Corporate financial reporting and disclosure.
A behavioral finance perspective
Abstract
Managers' information disclosure to firm's outsiders plays an essential role for mitigating information
asymmetry and agency problems. The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the managers' reporting
incentives in a broader context, while considering the preferences of behavioural investors and the
active role of financial analysts as target setters in particular. Further, this thesis aims to study the
optimal disclosure policy of different firms in the form of guidance and to analyze its influence on the
efficiency of analysts' earnings forecasts. Overall, this thesis contributes to the broad research on
behavioural corporate finance studying the determinants and consequences of managers' decisions when
managers and (or) investors suffer cognitive biases and (or) have behavioural preferences. The analysis
focuses on the investors' preferences as described in the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and neglects any cognitive biases that might lead to irrational decisions. The contribution of this
thesis is threefold. First, this thesis contributes to the empirical literature on the relevance of thresholds
by showing that reported performance, particularly around the zero target, influences the market value
of a firm and in particular the investors' perception of the value generated by intangibles such as R&D
investments. Second, the thesis extends the theoretical literature on earnings manipulation by analyzing
the managers' reporting incentives in an inter-temporal strategic game with the analysts where the
managers' payoff is determined by investors using the analysts' consensus forecast as a target when
evaluating earnings reports. Finally, instead of adapting the view that agents suffer some cognitive
limitations, this thesis contributes to the literature that seeks economic explanations for the analysts'
underreaction by showing empirically that managerial guidance is capable to explain such inefficiencies
in the analysts' forecasting behavior.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A challenging task for every capital economy is the optimal allocation of resources.
There are many managers aiming to attract investors’ capital and many investors
seeking to allocate their savings to attractive business opportunities. However,
matching investors’ and managers’ preferences appears to be complicated because
of conflicting interests and asymmetrically distributed information. Managers are
usually better informed than firm’s outsiders and they might use their insider ad-
vantage to overstate the value of their firms in order to attract more capital and to
misuse the investors’ savings.
Managers’ information disclosure to firm’s outsiders plays an essential role for
mitigating these problems. A significant part of this information is governed by reg-
ulatory authorities imposing minimum disclosure requirements to companies that
access the capital markets. The reporting choice available to managers is further
regulated by accounting standards that define commonly accepted rules of present-
ing economic performance to firm’s outsiders. If accounting regulation works per-
fectly, managers accounting disclosure reflects their private information on the real
business performance of the firm. However, if accounting regulation is imperfect,
which is the most likely case, managers may trade off between making account-
ing decisions to communicate their superior knowledge to firm’s outsiders and to
manage the business performance of the firm in order to signal their talent (Chaney
and Lewis, 1994), to influence the investors’ perception of firm’s bankruptcy risk
(Trueman and Titman, 1989) or because of their own myopic preferences (Stein,
1989).
In addition to the information that managers are required to provide by regula-
tory standards, some managers disclose information voluntarily in the form of press
releases, earnings forecasts, presentations and discussions during conference calls
with financial analysts. Their main motives are capital market driven. By disclosing
information voluntarily, managers can reduce the cost of capital, thereby reducing
the firm’s costs of external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the premium
that investors demand for bearing information risk (Barry and Brown, 1985; Mer-
ton, 1987). Further, managers disclose private information to improve the liquidity
and to reduce the volatility of firm’s shares (Hsieh, Koller and Rajan, 2005).
If managers’ compensation contracts are based on the market value of the firm,
their incentives to manipulate reporting and to disclose information voluntarily de-
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pends significantly on the investors’ perception of value reflected in their response
to reporting numbers and managers’ statements. Deep insights into investors’ deci-
sion behavior and in particular into the question how investors select and evaluate
information is provided by the broad experimental research in behavioral finance.
The main findings concerning investors’ preferences are summarized in the prospect
theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Very briefly, the theory states that agents
evaluate outcomes with respect to a certain benchmark and that outcomes below this
benchmark are overly disappointing compared to outcomes above it. The prospect
theory finds additional support by several empirical studies analyzing the behavior
of investors with respect to different benchmarks such as previous earnings (Barth,
Elliot and Finn, 1999), the earnings consensus forecast of the analysts following the
firm (Kasznik and McNickols, 2002; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 2006; Bar-
tov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002), and zero earnings (Degeorge,
Patel and Zeckhauser, 2006). The evidence suggests that the investors’ preferences
create specific incentives for managers with market based compensation contracts
to use the discretion provided by reporting standards and manage performance num-
bers.
The task of evaluating managers’ financial reporting is rather straightforward
compared to the processing of managers’ voluntary disclosure, since the latter re-
quires the ability to transform general statements into financial figures. Financial
analysts are often considered to be the best prepared firm’s outsiders able to per-
form this task. In their aim to improve the precision of their earnings forecasts, they
participate in conference calls, have a direct contact with the officers of the firms
they follow and try to take advantage of the private information of the managers as
firm’s insiders. Used as a proxy for shifts in the investors’ expectations, changes in
the analysts’ consensus forecast reflect the impact of managers’ voluntary disclo-
sure on the market value of the firm. In particular, they help to establish a direct
link between the optimal disclosure policy of the managers and some patterns in
analysts’ and investors’ behavior that can be considered as irrational otherwise.
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the managers’ reporting incentives
in a broader context, while considering the preferences of behavioral investors and
the active role of financial analysts. Further, this thesis aims to study the optimal
disclosure policy of different firms in order to establish a link to the behavior of
analysts as information providers. To achieve these goals, this thesis is divided into
three parts, each dedicated to a separate question. The parts are connected to each
other as they analyze different aspects of the managers’ reporting and disclosure
incentives and their consequences, but they can be read independently as each part
elaborates a research question separately.
The first question we aim to answer is related to the firms’ reported earnings and
their relevance for the investors’ perception of the value of its intangible assets. In
particular, we study whether earnings reports above and below the zero threshold
have any information content on the firms’ ability to employ capital efficiently. If
the reported profits are informative for investors, they can be expected to affect the
market value of the intangible assets generated by R&D investments for example.
This question is analyzed in the first part of this thesis in the working paper
2
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”Corporate Profits and the Market Value of R&D Investments”. The evidence sug-
gests that managers reporting earnings above the zero threshold receive a higher
valuation for their R&D activities than managers reporting earnings below the zero
threshold. The investors appear to disregard the optimism of managers boosting
R&D investments in the face of negative profits and prefer to focus on the risks
associated with such investments. In general, this effect remains stable over time,
but the investors’ sensitivity to shifts in R&D investments and earnings changes
over the business cycle. Therefore it is possible that the managers’ incentives to
manipulate earnings change with the R&D investment cycle as well.
The managers’ motivation to manipulate reported earnings is analyzed in the
second part of this thesis. The question is studied theoretically in the working pa-
per ”The Earnings Game with Behavioral Investors”, which is a joint work with
Thorsten Hens. To be more realistic, the managers’ reporting respectively manipu-
lation problem is studied in an inter-temporal context with analysts trying to uncover
the managers’ manipulation. The analyzed strategic game allows to derive conclu-
sions on the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings reports in dependence on
three factors. The first one is the investors’ preferences towards earnings reports
above and below the analysts’ consensus forecast. In our model, this threshold is
not exogenously given but determined by the best response of the analysts that be-
have strategically. The second factor we consider is the managers’ compensation.
Finally, we analyze how the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings changes
when managers disclose information voluntarily in order to guide the earnings ex-
pectations of the firm’s outsiders. The analysis shows that given the asymmetric in-
vestors’ reaction to earnings surprises reported in empirical studies, managers have
strong incentives to manipulate earnings. In dependence on their time preferences,
managers may choose to manipulate earnings in order to match the consensus fore-
casts. In this equilibrium, rational investors are systematically fooled. Assuming
that managers’ preferences are equally distributed in the economy, we also derive
conclusions on how the absolute level of manipulation in the economy changes with
the investors’ preferences, the managers’ compensation package and the earnings
guidance they may provide to analysts.
If managers disclose information systematically in order to guide the analysts in
their effort to estimate the next period earnings, analysts’ forecasts and forecast er-
rors may exhibit certain patterns, which are expected to be related to the managers’
disclosure incentives. This question is studied in the last part of this thesis in the
research paper ”Managers Guidance and Analysts Underreaction”, which is a joint
work with Peter Woehrmann. The paper is motivated by the evidence provided in
several empirical investigations indicating the existence of significant time varying
biases in the earnings forecasts of financial analysts. These biases are usually at-
tributed to the analysts’ liability to cognitive limitations. For example, a positive
autocorrelation of analysts’ forecast errors is commonly explained by analysts’ un-
derreaction. We develop a random dynamical system describing the evolution of
analysts’ forecasts and firm’s prices and show that managerial guidance is capa-
ble to explain such inefficiencies in the analysts’ forecasting behavior. This result
is well supported by empirical tests. In particular, we find that the managers of
growth firms guide stronger than the managers of value firms, which allows further
3
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conclusions on the precision and efficiency of earnings forecasts released for value
and growth stocks in line with the existing literature.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the broad research on behavioral corporate
finance studying the determinants and consequences of managers’ decisions when
managers and (or) investors suffer cognitive biases and (or) have behavioral pref-
erences.1 In this thesis, we focus on the investors’ preferences as described in the
prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and neglect any cognitive bi-
ases that might lead to irrational decisions. Our contribution is threefold. First,
we contribute to the empirical literature on the relevance of thresholds by showing
that reported performance, particularly around the zero target, influences the market
value of a firm and in particular the investors’ perception of the value generated by
R&D investments. Second, we extend the theoretical literature on earnings manip-
ulation by analyzing the managers’ reporting incentives in a strategic game where
managers’ payoff is determined by investors using the analysts’ consensus forecast
as a target when evaluating firm’s reported earnings. Finally, instead of adapting the
view that agents suffer some cognitive limitations, this thesis contributes to the lit-
erature that seeks explanations for the analysts’ underreaction by offering a rational
economic explanation for their forecasting behavior.
1There are several surveys on this topic, see for example Shefrin (2001) or Baker, Ruback and
Wurgler (2004).
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Corporate Profits and the Market Value of
R&D Investments
2.1 Introduction
The market value of firm’s shares reflects the value of all its net assets. In some in-
dustries, the main part of the firm’s value may reflect primarily its intangible assets
representing a non-physical claim on future cash flows, e.g. patents, copyrights,
trademarks. The most commonly used indicator of cumulated intangibles is re-
search and development (R&D) expenditures. R&D investments contribute directly
to the development of new products and aid indirectly the successful adoption of
technologies developed outside the firm. In particular, R&D investments aim to
improve the profitability of the firm.
The impact of R&D investments on the future economic performance of the
firm is highly unpredictable since it is affected by market and technology uncer-
tainty but also by firm’s ability to exploit emerging opportunities created by the
uncertain environment.1 The firm’s ability to manage the uncertainties in its envi-
ronment successfully is particularly important for the valuation of its R&D projects
because R&D projects become profitable only when the goods in which the R&D is
embodied are sold and productivity gains are realized. Thus, in knowledge–driven
industries investing in R&D on a continuous base the earnings companies generate
are not only a capital constraint but also an indicator for firm’s ability to employ
R&D capital profitably. If this signal is informative then the value of R&D invest-
ments would vary among firms with different profits.
The current paper examines whether the reported pre–R&D earnings (or profits)
influence the investors’ perception on the value of firm’s R&D expenditures. The
results of the empirical tests indicate that firms with positive profits receive a higher
market rent for their R&D activities than firms with negative reported profits. This
suggests that simply boosting R&D expenditures would not be enough to generate
higher growth expectations and the market value of the firm would not increase pro-
portionally to firms’ R&D expenditures. Further, comparing the R&D elasticity of
firms with different profits, the results indicate that investors do not fully share the
1There are certainly significant interactions between these effects, though the complexity of the
relationships suggest to focus initially on the firms’ characteristics reflected in their accounting re-
ports.
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strong optimism of managers deciding to invest in R&D projects under the pres-
sure of low current profits and cutting costs. Instead, investors appear to be more
concerned with the risks associated with the R&D investments and the possibility
that managers ”throw good money after bad”. In general, this effect remains stable
over time, but the investors’ sensitivity to shifts in R&D investments and profits
changes over the business cycle. Therefore, it is possible that managers’ incentives
to manipulate the reported profits follow the R&D investment cycle.
Previous studies on the relationship between R&D investments and market value
has identified two main reasons why R&D investments might influence the market
value of the company. The first link between expected returns and R&D arises from
the notion that R&D expenditures create intangible assets. The idea is based on the
theoretical concept that in equilibrium the market value of the firm is equal to the
book value of the assets composing the firm. Deviation from this relationship arises
either because the market is not in an equilibrium or there is an unmeasured source
of rents driving a wedge between the market and book value of the assets (see Hall,
1993). The question, whether this wedge is associated to R&D expenditures has
been the subject of several studies. In general, discrepancies in the estimated rela-
tionship between firms’ market value and their R&D investments are mainly caused
by differences in the variables included in the estimation equation.2. The sources
of rents considered in addition to R&D expenditures are for example patenting ac-
tivities (see Griliches, 1981; Megna and Klock, 1993; Pakes, 1985), advertising
expenditures, sales growth (see Hall, 1993; Hirschey and Weygandt, 1985), market
concentration (see Hirschey and Weygandt, 1985; Jaffe, 1986), or monopoly power
(see Johnson and Pazderka, 1993). The particular importance of earnings when esti-
mating the value of R&D expenditures is addressed by Sougiannis (1994). He raises
the question whether past R&D expenditures are reflected in the market valuation
directly or indirectly through their impact on earnings. His results show that the
indirect impact is much stronger than the direct one, i.e. the rents associated with
R&D expenditures are better explained by the earnings they generate rather than by
the R&D investments themselves.
The second potential link is closely related to the risk characteristics of R&D
investments. While the costs affect firms’ profits immediately the benefits are often
ambiguous and likely to materialize in subsequent periods if ever. Thus, managers
continuing to invest in R&D although previous investments did not return the ex-
pected profits are either convinced that their current efforts will be successful or
biased because they consider previous investments as ”sunk costs”. As a result,
investors may become overoptimistic about the innovative potential of R&D inten-
sive firms systematically overlooking the possibility that many R&D projects are
not profitable. On the other hand, if investors are myopic and value firms by the
face value of their financial statements, the value of R&D capital will be on average
underpriced by the market.
Several studies analyze how do investors value risky R&D investments. Chan,
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) for example analyze the performance of portfo-
lios based on different firm characteristics and conclude that simply doing R&D by
itself does not give rise to differential stock price performance, on average. Specifi-
2Hall (1999) and Mairesse and Sassenou (1991) provide summaries on the results.
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cally, the market appear to be sluggish revising its expectations about the prospects
of R&D activities by firms with poor past returns. This result indicates that in-
vestors do not share the optimism of managers spending heavily on R&D despite
poor market returns and pressure on cost cuts.
Encouraged by the results of Sougiannis (1994) suggesting that investors use
earnings to elicit information on the value of R&D expenditures, this study goes fur-
ther analyzing the question how investors assess the potential profitability of firms’
R&D activities in the context of their reported profits. Differences across compa-
nies with respect to their profits are reflected in a continuous non-linear function.
Using this function as a condition when estimating the value of R&D investments
reflected in the market capitalization of the company allows drawing conclusions on
investors’ sensitivity to changes in firms’ R&D investments in the context of con-
tinuous profits changes. Characteristics as ”high” and ”low” profit firms are then
not exogenously specified but determined by the data.3
This chapter is organized as follows. The formal statement of the problem is
provided in section 2. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedure; it also
discusses some empirical properties of the data. The results of the estimated equa-
tions are discussed in section 4. Section 5 provides an interpretation of the results.
The main conclusions are summarized in section 6.
2.2 The Problem
The typical model of market value used in previous studies hypothesizes that the
market value of the firm is a function of its assets (see Hall, 1999; Hall and Kim,
1997; Hall and Hayashi, 1989; Johnson and Pazderka, 1993). There are two types
of assets: tangible assets TA (e.g. physical capital) and intangible assets IA (e.g.
patents, copyrights, knowledge capital). Thus, the market value of the firm Vt at
time t can be expressed as:
Vt = f (TAt , IAt−θ, IAt−θ+1, ..., IAt) (2.1)
where f is an unknown function describing how the assets combine to create value.4
θ is a gestation lag reflecting the idea that the production of knowledge capital is
different than the production of capital goods and it is likely to involve projects with
durations of several years θ = 1, ...,T , where T reflects the age of the firm.
Adapting a multiplicative separable specification for the function f , the market
value function (2.1) can be written as:
Vt = (TAt)β1
T
∑
θ=1
(IAt−θ)β2,θ (2.2)
TAt are the real assets of the company such as fixed assets and inventories. They
are measured by the book values of these items and represent the net capital stock
3The idea of using a non-linear relationship when estimating the importance of variables is not
new. In a different context, McConnell and Servaes (1985) for example use a quadratic regression
and show that the relation between corporate value and leverage is nonlinear, i.e. it is negative for
”high” growth firms and positive for ”low” growth firms.
4This function is linear (in the logs) if assets provide constant returns to scale.
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of the company. The value of the intangible assets IA are not reported and must
be estimated. One possibility to estimate the value of intangible capital is to refer
to firm’s R&D expenditures and use them as an indicator of innovation and growth
power.5. Using current and past R&D expenditures as a proxy for intangible capital
(2.2) and taking the natural logarithms of both sides, we obtain:
lnVt = βˆ1,t lnTAt +
T
∑
θ=1
βˆ2,t lnRDt−θ (2.3)
The ratio VtTAt , respectively the difference lnVt − lnTAt , reflects the quality of firm’s
current and anticipated projects as perceived by investors. The company should
acquire more assets if the market valuation of those assets is greater then the re-
placement costs usually reflected in the book value of the assets. In other words,
new investments are considered by investors as profitable if they are used so as to
create at least as much value as the cost of reproducing the new assets. Therefore,
one can learn whether R&D expenditures give rise to intangible capital by simply
studying the relationship between firms’ R&D investments and their market value.
In the simplest case, this relationship is linear, so that every unit money spent
on R&D is transformed in market value by a multiple. Clearly, this multiple can
vary across industries and over time as previous studies have already reported. Hall
(1999) and Mairesse and Sassenou (1991) provide summaries of the estimated co-
efficients in dependence on the variables additionally included in the estimation
equation. Though, to our knowledge, none of these studies explain how this mul-
tiple depends on firm’s characteristics. This is important since all investments in
R&D are not necessary good, the question is if there are firm specific factors that
systematically explain why the market gives more credits to some firms and less
to others although all of them invest in R&D. Since R&D expenditures are dedi-
cated to improve the current and future earnings of the firm, the simplest way to
learn something about the value of R&D activities is to look at firms’ profits. Given
that the market differentiates between companies investing in R&D, two firms with
different R&D earnings contribution, should also differ in their market valuations.
Various methods aid testing this intuition. The simplest one is to split the sample
in firms with high and firms with low profits. The main problem with this approach
is that splitting firms requires setting up a certain criteria in advance. Therefore the
criteria cannot be endogenously determined. For example, setting the cut off by zero
and dividing firms in two groups, one with positive and one with negative earnings,
will be inconsistent with the data if investors apply another criteria to order firms.
Applying the wrong cut off criteria would lead to rejecting the hypothesis that in-
vestors differentiate between firms doing R&D and to the erroneous conclusion that
R&D activities by all firms within an industry have the same value. An additional
disadvantage of the approach is that dividing firms in groups necessary reduces the
sample of observations within each group. This is disadvantageous for interpreting
the results in terms of significance.
To overcome the problems associated with applying predefined criteria, we sug-
gest a model based on one equation including all firms in the sample for a given
5Several studies demonstrate that R&D expenditures creates intangible capital (see, for example,
Hall, 1993; Hirschey and Weigandt, 1985)
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period. Differences in firms’ profitability can be described using a function with
similar properties as the indicator function but without requiring a decision for the
cut off point in advance. One candidate with this property is a non-linear function
that can ’switch’ between zero and one but also allow for the existence of an interval
where the function can take values between zero and one. Additionally, the function
must include a shift parameter, which determines the cut off or ’switching’ level.
One example for a non-linear function with the desired properties is:
ψ(X) = (1+ e−a−bX)−1 (2.4)
The function is s-shaped and takes values between zero and one. Its tightness de-
pends on the parameter b. Larger values of b reduce the interval, where the function
takes values between zero and one. Then, ψ(X) behaves like an indicator function.
The smaller the parameter b, the flatter is the function. In the extreme case, it is lin-
ear. a is a shift parameter. It determines the level of X where the function ’switches’.
A general form of the function and a discussion on its properties is included in the
appendix.
For the purpose of this study testing whether investors evaluate R&D invest-
ments of firms in dependence of their profitability, the function ψ(X) is particularly
helpful in different aspects. First, it allows to determine the switching point endoge-
nously from the data. This is important for our analysis since we do not know for
sure what is ’high’ and what is ’low’ profitability from investors point of view and
over time. Second, since the function is continuous, it allows estimating how the
market value of the company changes to small shifts in the R&D expenditures and
earnings simultaneously. Third, applying this functional form to estimate the im-
pact of earnings on the market value of R&D, the study is able to draw conclusions
on how does R&D elasticity change over time for firms with different earnings lev-
els. Finally, the specification allows testing for non-linear dependence using a linear
model.
The model defined in equation (2.3) is extended as follows:
lnVt = βˆ0,t + βˆ1,t lnTAt + βˆ2,t lnRDt + βˆ3,tψ(Xt) lnRDt + εt (2.5)
where Xt is a random variable reflecting the earnings of the company in time t.6 The
difference to the linear model in equation (2.3) is in the third term. It introduces an
indirect relationship between R&D investments and market value as a non-linear
function of firm’s profitability measured by Xt . This relationship is different from
the indirect relationship studied by Sougiannis (1994) in two aspects. First, it is
simultaneously determined by one equation instead of a system of equations stating
first the link between R&D investments and earnings and then between earnings
and market value. Second, it allows drawing conclusions on the value of R&D
investments conditioned on earnings. In contrast, applying the system of equations
as used by Sougiannis (1994) one can compare the informativeness of earnings and
R&D for investors valuing the R&D activities of the firm. However, conclusions on
the particular impact of earnings on the value of firms’ R&D investments are not
offhand possible.
6Alternatively, one can take other profitability measures, e.g. operating profits. Though, the basic
results (not reported here) do not differ substantially.
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Since product development usually takes several years an additional issue when
explaining the link between the market value of the firm and its R&D activities is
the importance of previous R&D investments. The problem is the exact deprecation
rate, respectively the percentage of past R&D investments, which are still associated
with earnings growth in the future as reflected in the market price of the company.
An alternative to using lagged R&D investments as indicator for expected profit
growth is to focus on realized profit reflecting previous R&D investments returning
products that increase the profit as previously expected by investors. A necessary
condition for this argument to hold is that firms’ profits are strongly research-driven
and firms invest in R&D on a regular basis. If firms invest in R&D occasionally,
the earnings in the next period would not reflect their profitability correctly since
product development usually takes several years. However, if firms run various
R&D projects requiring continuous investing in R&D, the observed earnings reflect
these projects that were successful.
To capture the effect of previous R&D investments in the model, equation (2.5)
is modified slightly to:
lnVt = βˆ0,t + βˆ1,t lnTAt + βˆ2,t lnRDt + βˆ3,tψ(Xt) lnRDt + βˆ4,tψ(Xt)+ εt (2.6)
Since this transformation is additive without including the variable R&D, it does
not have any impact on the elasticity of market value to current R&D expenditures,
which is equal to:
∂lnVt
∂lnRDt
= βˆ2,t + βˆ3,tψ(Xt) (2.7)
The regression parameters βˆ1,t , βˆ2,t and βˆ4,t in equation (2.6) are expected to be
positive. The intercept βˆ0,t captures the valuation effect of variables not included in
the equation, which may be positive, negative, or zero. The parameter measuring
the indirect effect of R&D on market value can be also positive, negative, or zero.
2.3 Sample Selection Procedure and Data Description
The database for this study includes accounting and pricing data of companies be-
longing to the pharmaceutical industry as specified and reported by Datastream.
This industry is particularly interesting because R&D investments are the lifeblood
for the companies, i.e. one can expect that investments in R&D are one of the main
sources of their future profits.
The data covers the period from 1990 to 2004. Firms are included in the sample
for year t if data are available on market value, total assets and R&D expendi-
tures for a financial year ending in year t. There are no restriction on the market
capitalization of the companies in order to utilize the maximum possible sample
in the following tests. Unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias is undoubt-
edly an issue, though most of the previous empirical studies do not deal with it.
Moreover, the literature, which has adjusted for selectivity, conclude that Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) results are probably not too seriously biased (see Bosworth and
Rogers, 1998).
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The sample consists of 148 US pharmaceutical companies with market capital-
ization ranging from USD 0.05 Mill. to USD 201755 Mill. (as of the end 2004).
The broad range of market capitalization reflects the companies’ diversity particu-
larly with respect to their R&D investment activities. During the period from 1997
to 2004, some firms invest more than USD 2000 Mill. and others spending less than
USD 0.011 Mill. (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of R&D expenditures (1997-2000)
Thousand USD 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean 149’025 130’024 120’969 123’235
Median 4’835 4’400 4’291 4’940
Maximum 1’905’000 2’140’000 2’279’000 2’776’000
Minimum 7 44 51 17
Std.Dev. 426’943 425’819 434’781
Skewness 2.90 3.43 3.84 4.20
Kurtosis 9.94 13.48 16.53 19.97
Observations 78 101 121 134
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of R&D expenditures (2000-2004)
Thousand USD 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 135’698 151’165 160’843 185’509
Median 5’299 6’283 7’091 7’158
Maximum 4’435’000 4’847’000 5’176’000 7’070’000
Minimum 11 11 11 11
Std.Dev. 559’762 622’775 661’640 812’383
Skewness 5.19 5.20 5.30 6.04
Kurtosis 32.48 32.23 33.38 43.96
Observations 146 148 148 148
Since 1998, the mean and the median of R&D expenditures increases contin-
uously. Though, the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis increases as well.
With the time, the wedge among the level of R&D activities deepen so that more
companies become outliers. Figures 2.1 illustrates this result. Figure 2.2 shows the
R&D distribution without far outliers. As one can easily see, the level of R&D ex-
penditures for half of the companies is much lower (about USD 30 Mill.) than the
level of R&D investments of the far outliers (more than USD 1000 Mill.).
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Figure 2.1: R&D expenditures
The boxplot summarizes the distribution of R&D expenditures across companies for each year in
the period 1995-2004. The data with the symbols ’◦’ and ’∗’ represent outliers.
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Figure 2.2: R&D expenditures without large outliers
The box portion of the boxplot represents the first and third quartiles (middle 50 percent of the data).
The median is depicted using a line through the center of the box, while the mean is drawn using the
symbol ’∗’.
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One possible explanation for the large differences in the level of R&D expen-
ditures across firms is that bigger companies usually have larger capacity to ex-
tend their R&D investments than smaller firms. To eliminate this effect in analyz-
ing companies’ heterogeneity, the R&D expenditures are normalized with the book
value of total assets as reported by the companies at the end of each year. Figure
2.3 shows the distribution of the ratio R&D expenditures to total assets in a boxplot.
The median is almost constant over time. There are still some outliers, however,
they are smaller than the outliers in the R&D distribution (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.3: R&D expenditures to total assets (1995 - 2004)
The boxplot summarizes the distribution of the ratio R&D expenditures to total assets across
companies for each year in the period 1990-2004. The box portion of the boxplot represents
the first and third quartiles (middle 50 percent of the data). The median is depicted using a
line through the center of the box, while the mean is drawn using the symbol ’∗’ within the
box. The data with the symbols ’◦’ and ’∗’ are outliers.
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
The more interesting question for this study is the importance of firm earnings
for the market value of R&D investments. To approach the question descriptively,
Figure 2.4 plots the distribution of firms R&D expenditures relative to their reported
earnings after taxes but before R&D expenditures.
Figure 2.4: R&D expenditures to earnings (1995 - 2004)
The boxplot summarizes the distribution of the ratio R&D expenditures to profits (after
taxes and before R&D expenditures) across companies for each year in the period 1995-
2004. The box portion of the boxplot represents the first and third quartiles (middle 50
percent of the data). The median is depicted using a line through the center of the box,
while the mean is drawn using the symbol ’∗’. The data with the symbols ’◦’ are outliers.
Far outliers have been neglected.
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Until 1998 and after 2003, the middle fifty percent of the companies continued
to invest strongly in R&D although their reported profits have been negative in the
current period. For the period between 1998 and 2003, the R&D expenditures of
firms with positive and negative earnings do not differ substantially. Intuitively,
firms deciding to invest more intensively in R&D in the face of negative earnings
must be very confident in the prospects of their investments. The question is whether
and to which extend do investors share the optimism of managers and reward their
R&D investments.
2.4 Results
All tests are performed using (linear) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with
multiple variables. The variables are defined as follows:
• Vt is a vector including the market capitalization of all firms at the end of the
first quarter of year t +1.7
• TAt a vector including the total assets as reported by the firms in the sample
on the end of year t
• RDt is a vector including the R&D expenditures of firms reported on the end
of year t
• Xt is a vector including the after tax earnings before R&D expenditures (prof-
its) as reported by the firms on the end of year t
To minimize the problem of heteroscedasticity, all variables are included with their
logarithmic values. Additionally, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients
are reported after adjusting for heteroscedasticity according to the White test. Auto-
correlation is not an issue, since the model is specified for a cross-sectional sample
with no lags over the time.
First, we estimate the market value of intangible capital as specified by equation
(2.3). Then, we test the causal dependence between R&D expenditures and profits
and confirm the adequacy of the specification in equation (2.6). The market value
of R&D investments conditioned on the reported earnings is estimated with two
different methods. The first splits the sample of firms in two groups in dependence
of their earnings and estimate the market value of R&D expenditures of the firms
within each group. The second approach estimates the market value of firms’ R&D
investments in dependence on the level of their reported profits directly by using the
non-linear specification from equation (2.6).
2.4.1 The value of R&D investments as intangible capital
Adopting the notion that firm’s value is determined by the capitalized value of its
asset, the paper proceeds estimating the market value of firms’ intangible assets
7The underlying assumption is that investors receive the accounting reports for the current year
within the first quarter of the next one. Accounting information is reflected in market prices as soon
as it is available.
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approximated by their investments in R&D. Table 2.3 reports the estimated coeffi-
cients.
Table 2.3: The market value of intangible assets
lnVt = βˆ0,t + βˆ1,t lnRDt + ε
P values are reported under every coefficient in parentheses. The (centered) R2
statistic explains the variation in lnVt after fitting the constant. SSR is the sum of squared
residuals. Standard errors are White-heteroscedasticity consistent.
log(Vt) βˆ0,t βˆ1,t R2 SSR N
2004 2.4314 1.0371 0.6248 463 148
(0.000) (0.000)
2003 2.7376 1.0242 0.6443 394 142
(0.000) (0.000)
2002 1.4594 1.0777 0.6108 486 140
(0.030) (0.000)
2001 1.9090 1.1000 0.7530 244 136
(0.109) (0.000)
2000 2.5110 1.0561 0.7028 274 130
(0.000) (0.000)
1999 -4.5628 0.8907 0.6812 185 106
(0.000) (0.000)
1998 3.7359 0.9526 0.6890 191 85
(0.000) (0.000)
1997 5.5772 0.7878 0.6457 144 70
(0.000) (0.000)
1996 4.9461 0.8516 0.7378 98 64
(0.000) (0.000)
Overall, the market value elasticity with respect to R&D investments is signif-
icantly different from zero for every year. It is continuously increasing over time
taking values from 0.8 to 1.1. The highest value is reached for the reporting year
2001, just before the overall industry price index drops down (see Figure 2.23).
The estimated coefficients may be overstated due to the omission of the tangible
assets as an explanatory variable because of its high correlation with the R&D in-
vestments. This issue is taken into account in the further analysis by including the
reported profits after taxes, which can serve as a proxy for firms’ size.
To get an intuition if there is more information on the elasticity parameter βˆ1,t ,
the market value of R&D investments is conditioned on the reported earnings. The
simplest way to get an idea on the relevance of earnings for the market value of
R&D expenditures is to plot the variables. The sample of companies is divided
in two groups: one containing firms reporting positive earnings (Xt > 0) and one
containing firms reporting negative earnings in the current period (Xt < 0). The
R&D expenditures and market values of the firms in both groups are plotted together
for each of the reporting years. If investors value R&D projects in dependance
on the current earnings, then the relationship between R&D investments and the
market value would be different in both groups. Figures 2.5 to 2.10 visualizes the
plausibility of this intuition for the sample of data from 1999 to 2004.
The plots show that the market value of R&D is not well determined by a sim-
ple linear function. In particular, the market value of firms with negative earnings
do not always increase with the level of R&D spending. One part of the firms with
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negative earnings receives similar valuation for their R&D activities as firms report-
ing positive earnings, though another part of the firms with negative earnings do not.
Thus, estimating the market value of R&D investments using a simple linear regres-
sion over the whole sample of firms without considering the importance of earnings
characteristics would not be very precise if one aims to draw a conclusion on the
market value of R&D investments. The accuracy of the results can be improved by
conditioning the market value of R&D investments on the firms’ earnings.
The simplest way to do this is to split the sample of firms in groups with different
level of earnings.8 The approach has the disadvantage that it reduces the number
of observations within each group. Additionally, it does not provide any results on
the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients with respect to different earnings levels.
To overcome this problems, this study includes a third dimension in the analysis
between market value and R&D investments describing the impact of earnings. The
results are discussed in the following.
8Another possibility to take account for different earnings levels is suggested by Johnson and
Pazderka (1993). They simply exclude companies reporting negative earnings and compare the
results.
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Figure 2.5: R&D market value (2004)
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Figure 2.6: R&D market value (2003)
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Figure 2.7: R&D market value (2002)
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Figure 2.8: R&D market value (2001)
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Figure 2.9: R&D market value (2000)
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Figure 2.10: R&D market value (1999)
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2.4.2 The causal dependence between R&D investments and profits
Before estimating how the market value of firms’ R&D expenditures varies in de-
pendence of the reported profits, we test whether the estimating equation (2.6) is
specified correctly. In particular, the following tests aim to verify the current level
of profits as variable reflecting the value of past R&D expenditures for the com-
pany. The tests are specified such as to estimate whether changes in past R&D
investments cause changes in adjusted earnings as assumed in equation (2.6) or
changes in past reported profits cause changes in current R&D expenditures. The
results are reported in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: The causal dependance between R&D investments and reported profits
(1) ∆RDt = αˆ0,t + αˆ1,t∆RDt−1+ αˆ2,t∆RDt−2+ βˆ1,t∆Xt−1+ βˆ2,t∆Xt−2+ ε
(2) ∆Xt = αˆ0,t + αˆ1,t∆Xt−1+ αˆ2,t∆Xt−2+ βˆ1,t∆RDt−1+ βˆ2,t∆RDt−2+ ε
Equation (1) tests if changes in past earnings cause changes in R&D expenditures.
Equation (2) tests if changes in past R&D expenditures cause changes in reported profits.
The tests are performed using differences in the variables in order to insure that the
variables included in the regressions are stationary.
P-values are reported under every coefficient in parentheses. The (centered) R2 statistic
explains the variation in ∆RDt and ∆Xt after fitting the constant. Standard errors are
White-heteroscedasticity consistent.
(1) αˆ0,t αˆ1,t αˆ2,t βˆ1,t βˆ2,t R2 N
2004 -3032 0.7645 1.1068 -0.3431 0.2811 0.7845 132
(0.426) (0.207) (0.001) (0.216) (0.057)
2003 862 0.1714 -0.1643 0.0531 0.1364 0.8151 132
(0.478) (0.135) (0.016) (0.000) (0.036)
2002 4342 -0.1479 0.9667 0.1035 -0.0045 0.6673 119
(0.084) (0.561) (0.034) (0.547) (0.814)
2001 -3792 0.5308 2.2907 0.0354 -0.2313 0.7234 98
(0.549) (0.411) (0.186) (0.102) (0.252)
(2)
2004 -8195 -1.4883 -2.1984 2.7742 5.7041 0.7672 132
(0.574) (0.002) (0.002) (0.422) (0.001)
2003 4662 0.4848 0.0138 1.4537 -0.6641 0.8153 132
(0.442) (0.000) (0.960) (0.007) (0.093)
2002 -16034 0.2196 -0.8882 2.6087 2.2173 0.8557 119
(0.259) (0.720) (0.000) (0.000) (0.395)
2001 1528 0.0273 0.3350 3.9078 -1.2559 0.8021 98
(0.855) (0.241) (0.201) (0.000) (0.572)
Comparing the significance of the coefficients βˆ1,t and βˆ2,t in the first equation,
we can conclude that changes in past earnings do not cause significant changes in
the current R&D expenditures except in year 2003.9 For this year, changes in the
past R&D expenditures cause also changes in current earnings so that the causal
dependance between the variable is eliminated. The significance of the coefficients
βˆ1,t and βˆ2,t in the second equation suggests that lagged changes in R&D expendi-
tures cause changes in current reported profits. This causal dependance is in line
9This result is valid if one requires that the coefficients are significant different from zero at the
5% level.
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with the assumption that the value of past R&D expenditures can be captured by
their impact on reported profits as formulated in equation (2.6).
2.4.3 The value of R&D investments in firms with positive and negative prof-
its
The results from the first section suggest that firms investing in R&D receive higher
market valuation on average. Though, not every firm can be successful in its R&D
activities and do best all the time. Therefore, we expect to see that smart investors
differentiate between firms investing in R&D by considering their current profitabil-
ity as reflected in the published earnings after taxes. The intuition behind this idea
is visualized in Figures 2.5 to 2.10. This section reports the results of an empirical
test estimating the significance of the intuition.
The test is performed by simply splitting the sample of firms in two groups: one
including companies reporting positive earnings (Group A) and another one includ-
ing firms reporting negative earnings in the current period (Group B). An indicator
function I determines to which group a firm belongs. The market value of R&D
expenditures is then estimated separately for each group. Table 2.5 summarizes the
results.
Table 2.5: The market value of R&D of firms with different reported profits
(Group A): lnVt = βˆ0,t + βˆ1,t lnRDtIXt>0+ εt
(Group B): lnVt = βˆ0,t + βˆ1,t lnRDtIXt<0+ εt
where IXt>0 =
{
1 for Xt > 0
0 for Xt < 0 and IXt<0 =
{
1 for Xt < 0
0 for Xt > 0
P-values are reported under every coefficient in parentheses. The (centered) R2 statis-
tic explains the variation in logVt after fitting the constant. Standard errors are White-
heteroscedasticity consistent. The total assets are excluded from the estimation equation
since they are highly correlated with the level of R&D investments.
Group A βˆ0,t βˆ1,t R2 N Group B βˆ0,t βˆ1,t R2 N
2004 4.3692 0.9140 0.8206 71 2.5962 0.9345 0.3888 77
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)
2003 4.8828 0.8824 0.8173 73 2.2711 0.9800 0.4693 69
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
2002 3.4256 0.9591 0.7210 68 2.1729 0.8958 0.3762 72
(0.000) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000)
2001 8.4592 0.5568 0.6685 67 8.0289 0.4500 0.4558 69
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2000 2.3358 1.1136 0.7845 57 4.3845 0.7837 0.4584 72
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1999 4.4852 0.9414 0.8284 50 7.0608 0.5420 0.2625 55
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
1998 4.3358 0.9509 0.8128 51 5.4772 0.6351 0.3324 34
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Until 2002, firms reporting positive earnings receive a higher market valuation
for their R&D activities than firms reporting negative earnings. After 2001, the
difference in the coefficients βˆ1,t is not significant at the 5% level.
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2.4.4 The value of R&D investments conditioned on the level of firms’ profits
To take a closer look on the significance of the relationship between the market value
of R&D investments and firms earnings a non-linear functional form describing the
sensitivity of market value to R&D investments in dependence on small changes
in firms’ profits is introduced. The advantage of this approach compared to the
previous one is that the estimation does not separate firms imposing assumptions
on the criteria that might be relevant for investors while evaluating firms’ R&D
activities in the context of their profits. Instead, these criteria are the output of an
estimation searching for the best fit with the data. The results are reported in Table
2.6.
All coefficients besides of the intercept are significant different form zero at the
5% level. The R2 statistic is in each year better than the statistic in the simple case
estimating the market value of R&D investments without conditioning on firms’
earnings (see Table 2.3). Moreover, the sum of squared residuals is in each year
lower. If one neglects companies with negative profits, the test does not always fit
better the data. Though, for this sample, this would mean to exclude approximately
one half of the companies each year (see the last column in Table 2.5).
Table 2.6: The market value of R&D conditioned on firms’ reported profits
lnVt = βˆ0,t + βˆ1,t lnRDt + βˆ2,t 11+e−a−bXt + βˆ3,t
1
1+e−a−bXt lnRDt + εt
P-values are reported under every coefficient in parentheses. The (centered) R2 statis-
tic explains the variation in logVt after fitting the constant. Standard errors are White-
heteroscedasticity consistent. SSR is the sum of squared residuals. The coefficients a and
b solve an optimization problem minimizing the p-value of the t-statistic. Clearly, these
values are not unique. It is possible that there are other values for a and b, for which the
relationship between the variables is significant as well.
logVt βˆ0,t βˆ1,t βˆ2,t βˆ3,t a b R2 SSR N
2004 2.8155 0.9092 5.9923 -0.3206 2 −0.14 0.6875 339 148
(0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041)
2003 -2.7507 1.3262 9.7669 -0.5940 -0.5 −0.14 0.7588 266 142
(0.215) (0.000) (0.001) (0.025)
2002 -11.845 1.5590 24.9899 -1.2452 -0.5 −0.15 0.8206 369 140
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
2001 -1.1326 1.1244 12.5293 -0.6468 0.5 −0.15 0.7969 200 136
(0.522) (0.000) (0.001) (0.022)
2000 1.3066 0.9570 18.6557 -1.0667 1.5 −0.15 0.7634 216 128
(0.270) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
1999 3.9806 0.7774 22.3340 -1.3429 2 −0.15 0.7385 151 106
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012)
1998 4.9831 0.6583 38.0382 -2.3825 3 −0.15 0.7747 138 85
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.014)
1997 6.9526 0.4355 30.9268 -1.8288 2.5 −0.15 0.8075 77 69
(0.000) (0.008) (0.012) (0.031)
The best way to interpret these results is to show the relationship between the
market value of the firms, its R&D investments and adjusted earning in a three-
dimensional plot (see Figure 2.11 to 2.22). The level of R&D expenditures is plotted
on the x-axis, reported profits are on the y-axis, and the vertical axis measures the
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market value of the firms. For each year there are two plots, one (on the left side)
representing the estimated relationship for 95% of the observations and one (on the
right side) with a smaller scale representing 75% (3. Quartile) of the firms.
In the following discussion we first consider the importance of reported profits
(y-axis) for the market value of R&D expenditures. Then, we focus on firms with
positive earnings and analyze how the market value of the firm changes when the
firm boost its R&D investments. Finally, the results are interpreted for the smaller
sample of firms including 75% of the observations.
For 95% of the firms (plots on the left side of the pages), the level of reported
profits has a significant impact on the market value of their R&D expenditures. The
effect is observed particularly for companies reporting positive profits. In general,
the market value of these companies increases with the level of their R&D invest-
ments. Though, the effect changes over time. With the strong increase in R&D
expenditures in 1998, even firms reporting negative profits receive a higher market
valuation for their R&D expenditures (see Figure 2.21). This effect mitigates over
time and profits become more and more important for investors valuing the R&D
activities of the firms. For the period from 2000 to 2002, the market value of R&D
investments increases smoothly with the reported profits. Though, the marginal
market return on R&D investments by firms in particular with the highest positive
profits is decreasing. Since 2003, the marginal return of R&D investing by all prof-
itable firms becomes constant.
To get an intuition on why the relative importance of profits changes over time
when investors estimate the market value of firms’ R&D one can look for example
at the industry price index.
There are three important market phases for the current discussion. The first
one is the year 2000. In this year the market value of the pharmaceutical companies
worldwide increased strongly. The second phase is the period from the first quarter
2001 to the first quarter 2003. During these two years, pharmaceutical companies
lost a significant part of their market valuation. The first signs of a slight recovery
can be seen in the last phase, which lasts from the first quarter 2003 to the first
quarter 2005.
The strong increase of market valuation during the first phase reduces the risk
premia required by investors so that the net present value of riskier projects particu-
larly those run by firms with negative projects increases. As a result, the sensitivity
of the market value of R&D investments to the current reported profits decreases
(see Figure 2.21). With the sharp decrease in the market valuation of the companies
in the first quarter 2001, the risk premia required by investors for holding shares of
companies with negative profits increases, so that the net present value of their R&D
projects decreases (see Figure 2.19). During the second phase, the R&D projects
of firms with negative are discounted stronger than the R&D investments of firms
with positive profits according to the higher risk premia required by investors (see
Figures 2.17 and 2.15). During the last phase, the level of reported profits do not
have any impact on the market value of R&D expenditures as long as the profits are
positive and the market value of the firm increases proportionally with firms’ R&D
expenditures (see Figures 2.13 and 2.11).
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Figure 2.23: Datastream World Pharmaceutical Index (1995 - 2005)
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The importance of negative profits for the market value of R&D investment is
better observable for firms with R&D investments and profits within the third quar-
tile (75% of the observations). Investors analyzing firms with low levels of R&D
investments do not condition the value of these investments on the firms’ reported
profits. The stronger firms decide to invest in R&D, the more important are the re-
ported profits for the market value of their R&D investments. With the recovery in
the overall market valuation in the last phase, the R&D projects of firms with pos-
itive profits gain more in value than the projects of firms with negative profits (see
Figures 2.14 and 2.12). That is, firms with positive profits have a stronger advantage
from the reduction in the overall risk premia than firms with negative profits.
Overall, in periods of sharp increase of the overall market valuation, the R&D
projects of firms with negative profits have a stronger advantage from the decrease
in the risk premia required by investors. When the risk premia increases, the net
present value of riskier R&D projects run by firms with negative profits decreases.
A slight recovery in the overall market valuation, i.e. a lower risk premia, increases
the net present value of R&D projects in particular for firms with positive prof-
its. As long as the firm report profits over the threshold its market value increases
proportionally to its R&D investments.
2.5 Discussion
Why should the value of R&D investments as reflected in the market value of the
firm increase with its profits? One possible explanation is related to the financial
restrictions of the firm. The profits earned by the company are necessary to fi-
nance R&D investments. For most well-established corporations, R&D spending
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is not strongly dependent upon internal cash flow, but pharmaceutical companies
are probably an exception (see Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Thus, the higher
the profits, the less restricted is the company with respect to covering further invest-
ments, which might be required in the following periods. The value of this flexibility
is embodied in the value of current R&D investments conditioned on firm’s profits
as reflected in the market value of the company.
Another explanation for the positive relationship between firm’s profits and the
value of its R&D investments is related to the skewness of firms’ profits - only a mi-
nority of new products lead to exceptional profits, most of the products return less
than the capitalized cost of their R&D investments (see Grabowski and Vernon[26]).
The products contribution to profits depends not only on the size and duration of the
investments but also on firm’s abilities to manage them efficiently. In the pharma-
ceutical industry, investments in R&D are the lifeblood of the companies. Addition-
ally, the product development usually requires continuous investments over several
years. From this perspective, firm’s current profits can be seen as indicators for the
profitability of past R&D investments, i.e. firm’s abilities to manage R&D projects
efficiently. Conditioning current R&D investments on this information, firms with
higher profits indicating a better implementation of past R&D projects are expected
to receive a higher valuation for their current R&D activities. Overall, positive prof-
its may relax the capital constraint of the company but also signal firm’s abilities to
manage R&D projects efficiently.
The effect of negative profits on the market value of firm’s R&D investments is
more puzzling. Intuitively, negative profits are not necessary bad since they force
managers to be very careful when selecting further R&D projects although past
R&D expenditures still do not return earnings. On the other hand, early stage firms
with few products in development may continue to invest although the results are
less than promising just because managers are reluctant to return funds to share-
holders. Additionally, if managers care about losses as suggested by Kahneman
and Tversky, they would probably feel comfortable gambling-to-get-back-to-even.
This increases also the probability for a default. The larger the R&D spending
when profits are negative the higher is the default risk, the more likely is it that
investors focus stronger on the probability that the firm can not sustain the planed
R&D growth and have to bankrupt. Overall, managerial decision to invest in R&D
despite negative profits may reflect managerial optimism in the prospect of the cur-
rent projects. Though, from investors’ perspective managerial incentives to take
more risks and continue poor projects ”throwing good money after bad” appears to
be stronger, so that firms reporting negative profits receive a lower market value for
their R&D investments than firms reporting positive profits.
What are the implications for the managers’ reporting? If investors evaluate
R&D projects differently in dependence on the level of the reported profits, then
managers have incentives to manage the reported numbers in order to receive a
higher market valuation for their R&D investments. If the earnings manipulation
remains uncovered by investors, managers’ manipulation would follow the R&D
investment cycle, i.e. in periods of high (low) R&D investments, managers would
manipulate reported profits up (down). The next chapter proves the existence of
such an equilibrium. The empirical validation of this hypothesis is a subject of
future research.
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2.6 Conclusion
In modern economics many firms invest strongly in intangible assets in particular
through R&D. This paper addresses the question whether firms’ reported earnings
are relevant for the market value of their R&D investments. The empirical evidence
reported in this study confirms that there is a certain direct link between R&D in-
vestments and the market value of the firm as reported in previous studies. In partic-
ular, the study shows that the effect depends on the current profits of the companies.
Firms reporting positive profits receive a higher market valuation for their R&D ac-
tivities than firms reporting negative profits. This effect is significant and persistent
over time. Though, in different market phases the investors’ sensitivity to shifts in
R&D investments and profits changes over the business cycle.
The results are highly significant for the sample of firms in the US pharmaceu-
tical industry. Further tests with firms in other knowledge-driven industries (e.g.
biotechnology, semiconductors) can provide insights to the question whether the
observed effects are common for firms in R&D-intensive sectors.
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The Earnings Game with Behavioral Investors
3.1 Introduction
Each quarter, the attention of the investors’ community is drawn to the earnings
numbers reported by public companies. However, these numbers themselves are of
much less relevance than their value relative to certain benchmarks.
The main benchmarks investors use are the previous earnings (Burg-stahler and
Dichev, 1997) and the analysts’ consensus forecast (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeck-
hauser, 1999; Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 1999; Freeman and Tse, 1992). Com-
pelling empirical evidence suggests that firms falling short of the benchmarks are
priced at a discount, which is larger in absolute terms than the premium the firms
get when they report earnings above the benchmark (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002;
Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Ultimately, executives
seem also to believe that hitting earnings benchmarks strengthens their creditabil-
ity, helps increasing their companies’ stock price (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal,
2005) as well as their compensation (Matsunaga and Park, 2001).
Given the empirical evidence on the relevance of benchmarks, we analyze the
question how the asymmetric price response to meeting and falling short of the
benchmarks affects the reporting decision of the managers. Assuming that the
benchmarks are exogenously given, previous studies conclude that the observed
patterns in the managers’ reporting are due to earnings management. However, it is
not clear whether managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings remain unchanged
when this assumption does not hold. In particular, it is ambiguous whether and how
managers would manipulate earnings when the analysts behave strategically when
playing the earnings game.
To answer this question, we propose a three–period model with a manager, an-
alysts and investors endowed with behavioral preferences. We show that when the
manager and the analysts behave strategically, the manager’s incentives to manip-
ulate earnings change as a response to the investors’ preferences defining the mar-
ket conditions, the manager’s compensation package and the manager’s guidance
provided to analysts. In particular, our results suggest that given the asymmetric
investors’ reaction to earnings surprises, the manager strongly prefers to manipu-
late earnings than to report truthfully independently of her compensation package.
If the manager is roughly indifferent between selling shares in the current or later
periods, she manipulates the earnings in order to meet the analysts forecasts. In this
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equilibrium rational investors are systematically fooled. In all other cases, investors
are able to reverse the manager’s manipulation so that the reporting decision of the
manager depends strictly on her time preferences. Assuming that manager’s pref-
erences are equally distributed in the economy, we also derive conclusions on how
the absolute level of manipulation in the economy changes with the investors’ pref-
erences, the manager’s compensation and the earnings guidance she may provide
to analysts. Our results suggest that whatever the manager’s compensation there
will be less manipulation in absolute terms when investors have behavioral pref-
erences. The absolute level of manipulation may also decrease if the manager are
compensated with stock options instead of shares independently on the investor’s
preferences. However, if investors are non–behavioral and the managers holding
stock options provide earnings guidance, i.e anticipates the action of the analysts
to their earnings reports, the absolute manipulation level in the economy would
increase compared to the no–guidance case.
In our framework, the manager’s decision to manipulate earnings is a matter of
an inter–temporal substitution. The manager may shift revenues from one year to
another at costs determined by the investors and in particular by their preferences
with respect to earnings reports.
Previous research on the question why managers manipulate earnings reports
provides other explanations. Using the idea that earnings management is costly,
Chaney and Lewis (1994) show that managers manipulate earnings to signal their
ability to generate value. By smoothing reporting earnings around the ”expected”
earnings report, high-value managers can increase the probability that investors
identify their ability of generating value correctly. On the other hand, if low-value
managers realize that the costs of misreporting exceeds the benefits of being iden-
tified as a high-value firm, then the earnings signals of the firms can be perfectly
informative in equilibrium. Instead of manipulating earnings in order to make in-
vestors believe the firm is more valuable, Trueman and Titman (1989) show that
firms manipulate earnings because they want investors to perceive the firm as less
risky. According to their model, lower-quality firms mimic higher-quality firms by
smoothing the earnings reports, which lowers the investors’ assessment of the prob-
ability of bankruptcy. Managers may also manipulate earnings because investors
are unable to observe the manager’s objectives and adjust to the bias added to the
earnings reports. The manager’s optimal level of manipulation is then determined
by the trade-off between some costs of earnings management and the benefit of
higher stock price resulting from higher reported earnings (see Fischer and Verrec-
chia, 2000). This idea is also used by Guttman, Kadan and Kandel (2004) in order
to explain why earnings reports are discontinuous around some thresholds. By hid-
ing some of their private information in a pooled report managers with different
economic earnings are able to increase their payoff by reducing the costs of earn-
ings manipulation. Further, firm’s earnings management choice may also be driven
by the choices made by its rivals. If a firm is compared by investors and creditors
with other firms in the same industry, it would manage its earnings simply because
it expect its rivals to do so (see Bagnoli and Watts, 2000). Finally, Stein (1989)
suggests that earnings management occurs if managers are myopic. The conclusion
rests basically on the assumption that investors form expectations based on the noise
in the earnings signals but not on the level of earnings relative to certain thresholds.
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The importance of thresholds is, however, emphasized in several empirical stud-
ies. Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) find that firms that report continuously growing
earnings are priced at a premium to other firms and the premium increases with the
length of the string. Myers and Skinner (2001) find that managers of such firms
usually have relatively large amount of personal wealth invested in the company
providing them with incentives to extend the earnings string making accounting
choices that avoid reporting adverse earnings.
The relevance of the consensus forecast is highlighted by other studies. Kasznik
and McNichols (2002) find that firms which meet expectations receive a higher
market value than firms that fail to meet the expectations. Although they addition-
ally conjecture that firms consistently meeting the consensus do so through strong
earnings, they cannot exclude the possibility that firms could meet expectations by
earnings manipulation and investors may fail to anticipate this. In a recent study,
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (2006) investigate the price response to earnings
reports meeting the consensus forecast over time. They find that firms meeting or
exceeding earnings thresholds experience economically and statistically significant
excess returns, which are particularly high in a bull market. Their results motivate
them to conjecture that investors seem to view earnings threshold attainment as an
important indicator of the health of the company, which encourage the managers
to manipulate earnings. To test the benefits from earnings manipulation, Bartov,
Givoly and Hayn (2002) examine the manner by which earnings management con-
tributes to the premium that firms receive when they meet or beet earnings expecta-
tions. They confirm that firms receive a premium if they manage to meet or beet the
consensus forecast and show, in addition, that investors are capable to discern the
effect of earnings management on the earnings surprise and discount the resulting
surprise, but the extent of this discount is small and not economically significant.
Further, Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that the stock price response to falling short
of the analysts expectations is disproportionately large for growth stocks.
Our research presented in this part of the thesis contributes the literature on
earning management in several ways. First, we extent the theoretical literature by
studying a three-period strategic game between a manager and the analysts rather
than a one–shot disclosure choice of different firms involved in a signaling game
with other competitors. That is, instead of assuming that there are high- and low-
value firms manipulating earnings to pool their reports, we use the empirical evi-
dence that investors value earnings reports with respect to thresholds to study the
manager’s manipulation incentives in a setting where the threshold is not exoge-
nously given but defined by analysts behaving strategically. Thus, the focus of our
study is not the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings when playing a game
with other managers endowed with private information regarding their value as in
the signaling literature. Instead we focus on the manager’s incentives to manipu-
late earnings when the manager is involved in a strategic game with the analysts.
Whereas the signaling literature assumes that the differences in the managers’ type
motivating earnings manipulation are exogenously given, we specify the analysts’
response representing a threshold for the value of earnings reports endogenously.
Second, by studying manager’s manipulation incentives when her payoff is de-
fined by behavioral investors we contribute to the general discussion on the eco-
nomic relevance of investors’ preferences for earnings reports that are at or above
29
Chapter 3
the target defined by the analysts. Some empirical studies have already hypothe-
sized that this investors’ attitude motivate managers to manipulate earnings in order
to meet the targets (see for example Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser, 1999). However,
they did not explicitly considered the possibility that analysts may be fairly aware
of their role as target setters, which again may change the manager’s motivation to
manipulate earnings.
Finally, our analysis contribute to the literature dealing with the definition of
regulatory standards. By studying a simple economy where the managers’ time
preferences are equally distributed, we derive conclusions on how the absolute level
of manipulation in that economy change with the investors’ preferences, the man-
agers’ compensation package and the earnings guidance provided by managers to
analysts.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the informa-
tion structure of the game and the decision processes of the manager, the investors
and the analysts. Section 3 defines the players of the game, their strategy sets and
payoffs. It also defines the game equilibria. The players’ strategies in equilibrium
are studied in section 4. The analysis is structured in three parts. The first part
considers the manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings when the manager holds
stock options and play the earnings game with behavioral and non–behavioral in-
vestors. The second part studies the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings,
when they hold stock options instead of shares and play the earnings game with
behavioral and non–behavioral investors. The third part analyzes how the manager
decides on earnings manipulation when she provides earnings guidance to analysts.
The main results as well as the impact of the market conditions, the manager’s com-
pensation and the manager’s guidance on the absolute level of manipulation in the
economy are summarized in section 5.
3.2 Information Structure and Decision Timing
We consider a three–period economy with one firm, analysts and a large number of
investors. The firm is controlled by a manager. The information structure and the
decision order of the agents in the economy are summarized as follows.
t−1 t t +1
1. Analysts: Ft 1. Nature: xt 1. Nature: xt+1
2. Manager: Dt 2. Manager: Dt+1
3. Analysts: Ft+1 3. Investors: Pt+1, Ct+1
4. Investors: Pt , Ct
In period t−1, the analysts make forecasts on the earnings that will be reported
by the manager in period t. The average of their forecasts in this period, i.e. the
consensus forecast, is denoted by Ft .
At the beginning of period t, nature chooses which state of ”true” earnings xt ∈
{x,x} realizes. All agents in the economy agree that the probability for observing
x is p and the probability for observing x is respectively 1− p. The ”true” earnings
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are also assumed to be common knowledge, so that the firm’s outsiders know the
moments of the ”true” earnings distribution. However, only the manager is able to
observe which state of ”true” earnings realizes in each period.
After observing xt and Ft , the manager decides whether and how to manipu-
late earnings. In dependence on the state of ”true” earnings and the manipula-
tion decision of the manager, earnings reports in period t are Dt = (Dt ,Dt), where
Dt = xt +m and Dt = xt +m, with m as the manipulation decision of the manager
given that xt = x, and m as the manipulation decision of the manager given that
xt = x. We assume that the manager’s discretion to manipulate earnings is limited
by certain bounds, i.e. m,m ∈ [mmin,mmax], where mmax > 0 and mmin < 0. That
is, the manager is allowed to inflate or deflate earnings but her report cannot be too
far away from the ”true” earnings, otherwise the auditors would not accept it. For
simplicity we assume that |mmax| = |mmin|. The bounds in our setting are common
knowledge.
The analysts use the manager’s report Dt to update their beliefs regarding the
next period earnings the manager will be able to report. The consensus forecast is
captured by Ft+1. Depending on the observed earnings in period t, i.e. Dt or Dt , the
consensus forecast for the earnings reported in t + 1 are denoted by F t+1 respec-
tively F t+1. The analysts communicate their updated expectations to investors and
they respond by adjusting the price of the firm’s shares Pt = (Pt ,Pt), which returns
the value of the firm’s stock options Ct = (Ct ,Ct). In our notation, Pt (Pt) is the
price of the firm’s shares and Ct (Ct) captures the value of the firm’s stock options
in period t given that xt = x (xt = x) and Dt = Dt (Dt = Dt).
In the last period, nature draws the ”true” earnings xt+1 ∈ {x,x}. In this pe-
riod, we assume that the manager does not make any decisions. His reporting is
defined by the ”true” earnings realizing in this period and the manipulation deci-
sion taken one period before. This is consistent with accounting standards such
as GAAP requiring that any discretionary element in reported earnings must be
eventually reversed over time so that at the end of the game, there is no manip-
ulation remained in the economy and the accumulated reported earnings reported
are equal to the accumulated ”true” earnings. We operationalize this institutional
requirement through a GAAP constraint requiring that the bias added in the pe-
riod t is reversed in the next one. The earnings reports in the last period are then
Dt+1 = (x−m,x−m,x−m,x−m) with xt+1 ∈ {x,x}.
Given the reported earnings Dt+1 = (x−m,x−m,x−m,x−m) and the consen-
sus forecast Ft+1 = (F t+1,F t+1), the investors determine the price of the company’s
shares Pt+1 = (Pt+1,Pt+1) where Pt+1 is the price of firm’s shares given that xt = x
respectively Dt = Dt and Pt+1 is the price of firm’s shares given that xt = x respec-
tively Dt = Dt .
The players’ actions in each state are summarized in the following figure.
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The order of events in our model is specified to be as realistic as possible. Al-
ternative designs are also conceivable. For example, the analysts may need some
time to issue the next period forecast, so that the immediate price response of the
investors in period t does not include the expectations of the analysts. Alternatively,
the analysts may issue several forecasts in the period t so that each time the investors
need to adjust their expectations and the price of firm’s shares. These alternative de-
cision designs do not affect our results given that all firm’s outsiders share the same
expectations regarding the next period reporting earnings.
3.3 The Investors
From the manager’s perspective, the investors represent a homogenous group that
determines the price of the firm’s shares using all available information efficiently.
In line with the empirical evidence (see for example Kasznik and McNichols, 2002;
Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kinney et. al., 2001), we assume that the price response
to deviations from the consensus earnings forecast is asymmetric. Investors reward
companies for meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations but penalize them
stronger for falling below this target independently of the firm’s absolute perfor-
mance. In models with asymmetric information, the reason underlying this price
response is the apparent information content in earnings surprises regarding the fu-
ture earnings potential of the firm. In this context, earnings manipulation is a signal-
ing device. In our model, the main driver for a manager deciding on her reporting
strategy is not her private information. Instead, we attempt to explain manager’s
decisions by the preferences of the investors while imposing minimal restriction on
the distribution of information among the agents in the economy. In particular, we
assume that investors are averse against negative earnings surprises because from
their perspective, the consensus forecast represents a reference point against which
investors judge earnings announcements and determine ultimately the value of the
company.
At least since the contribution of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the importance
of reference points became one of the main issues of research on decision making
under uncertainty. One of their core findings is that the disutility from a loss looms
greater than the utility from a similar gain. Kahneman and Tversky call this property
loss aversion. We use the idea that investors may be loss averse when evaluating the
earnings reported by the company to model the price response to earnings reports.
In our setting, the price of the firm’s shares is determined by two factors. The
first is the present value of the firm’s earnings reported at the end of each period.
The second factor is a premium (or discount) for meeting (falling short of) investors’
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expectations. Formally, the market value of the firm’s shares in period t respectively
t +1 can be written as:
Pt = Dt +δEIt Dt+1+ v(Dt −Ft) (3.1)
and
Pt+1 = Dt+1+ v(Dt+1−Ft+1) (3.2)
where δ = 11+r is the discounting rate and r is the interest rate representing the time
value of money. F is the consensus earnings forecast. EI represents the investors’
expectations, which are assumed to be equivalent to the expectations of the analysts
EA.
The function v(.) is the value function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) describing individual behavior under uncertainty. We use the idea that in-
vestors may be loss averse when evaluating the earnings reported by the company
and specify the function v as follows:
v(∆) =
{
∆ for ∆≥ 0
β∆ for ∆ < 0 (3.3)
In our setting, ∆ is the earnings surprise in each period, i.e. ∆t =Dt−Ft and ∆t+1 =
Dt+1−Ft+1. The parameter β> 1 represents the investors’ loss aversion. The higher
the loss aversion, the stronger is the investors’ disutility from a negative earnings
surprise and the lower would be the price of the company’s shares in this period. In
our setting the loss aversion parameter β > 1 reflects the asymmetry in the earnings
response function observed in empirical studies, e.g. by Kinney et al. (2001).
3.4 The Managers
The manager of the firm is responsible for the earnings reported at the end of each
period. The manager chooses her earnings report in order to maximize the expected
utility, which is specified as a function of the price of firm’s shares in period t and
t +1, i.e.
uM(Pt ,Pt+1,θ) = (1−θ)g(Pt)+θδEMt g(Pt+1) (3.4)
EM(.) represents the manager’s expectations, 0≤ θ≤ 1 is a factor determining the
relative importance of the market price of firm’s shares in period t and t + 1 from
the manager’s perspective and g(.) is a function describing the dependence of the
manager’s payoff on the price of the firm’s shares. Note that the manager’s objec-
tive function includes only direct monetary consequences of earnings manipulation.
Although including punishments for earnings manipulation and other external pay-
ments may be realistic, their consideration would be arbitrary.
There are a number of reasons why the manager might be interested in the mar-
ket price of the firm’s shares. One reason is the manager’s compensation. If it is
based on shares, the manager can sell them in period t and (or) in period t + 1 as
a response to some liquidity needs for example. If the manager holds shares, the
function g(.) is linear and θ represents the percentage of shares that the manager
prefers to carry over from period t to period t + 1. Alternatively, manager’s inter-
ests may be linked to the price of the firm’s shares if the manager’s compensation
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package contains stock options. In this case the function g(.) is non–linear and
1−θ is the percentage of options that the manager is allowed to exercise in period
t respectively the percentage of options that expire in period t.
In the following analysis we assume that θ represent the percentage of shares
or stock options that the manager desires to carry over to the next period accord-
ing to her time preferences. It is also realistic to assume that the manager’s time
preferences are private knowledge.
Finally, we assume that all earnings are paid as dividends at the end of each
period. There are no investments or share repurchases, and the company is all-
equity financed.
3.5 The Analysts
Empirical evidence suggests that the career advancement of the analysts is closely
linked to the accuracy of their predictions (see for example Hong and Kubik, 2003).
Since ”true” earnings are observable only by the firm’s manager, the performance
of the analysts can only be measured against the earnings reported by the manager.
Thus, the incentive of the average analyst is to provide a forecast that is as close as
possible to the reported rather than to the ”true” earnings. In particular, we assume
that the earnings forecasts of the average analyst are determined by a quadratic loss
function.
LA(Ft ,Ft+1) =−EAt−1(Ft −Dt)2−EAt (Ft+1−Dt+1)2 (3.5)
where EA represents the expectations of the average analysts.
3.6 The Earnings Game
The analysts are aware that their forecasts may affect the earnings reported by the
manager since the consensus forecast is used by investors as a target when evaluat-
ing the value of firm’s shares based on the earnings reports. On the other hand, the
manager knows that analysts’ consensus forecast affecting the price of the firm’s
shares and stock options depends on her reporting. Thus, one can expect that the
manager and the analysts behave strategically when deciding what earnings num-
bers to report respectively to forecast.
To describe the situation in which the manager and the analysts act in a setting of
strategic interpendence we define the game Γ = [I = {M,A},{SM,SA},{UM,UA}]
where I denotes the players in the game, SM is the strategy space of the manager,
SA is the strategy space of the average analyst, UM denotes the manager’s payoff
function and UA is the payoff function of the average analyst.
In our setting the players of the game include the manager of the firm and the
analysts estimating the earnings of the company announced at the end of each re-
porting period. The investors determine the market price of the firm’s shares but
they do not behave strategically. Their expectations can be regarded as equivalent
to the expectations of the average analyst.1
1In addition to providing earnings forecasts analysts are required to issue detailed reports with
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In our setting, firm’s outsiders are required to make decisions under asymmet-
ric information. Since they are not able to observe which state of ”true” earnings
has been realized in the previous period, they cannot determine the manipulation
included in the earnings reported by the manager. This information is however es-
sential for the next period earnings reports expected by firm’s outsiders because they
know that any manipulation done in period t is reversed in period t +1.
The expected manipulation of firm’s outsiders is determined by the level of ma-
nipulation and the probability that the manager has manipulated the earnings in
this way. We denote the level of manipulation expected by the firm’s outsiders as
n = (n,n), where n (n) is the manipulation conjecture of the firm’s outsiders given
that xt = x (xt = x). Thus, when estimating the probability that the manager has
manipulated the earnings reports by n respectively n, firm’s outsiders estimate the
probability that nature has drawn x respectively x. The prior probability for xt = x is
p. The posterior belief of the firm’s outsiders after that xt = xt after observing Dt is
denoted by µ(x|Dt). We assume that the posterior beliefs are formed by Bayes rule,
i.e.
µ(x|Dt) = p(Dt |x)pp(Dt |x)p+ p(Dt |x)(1− p) (3.6)
where p(Dt |x) is the conditional probability for observing Dt given that xt = x and
p(Dt |x) is the conditional probability for observing Dt given that xt = x. For exam-
ple, if Dt = Dt = Dt then µ(x|Dt) = p and if Dt 6= Dt then µ(x|Dt) = 1 if xt = x and
µ(x|Dt) = 0 if xt = x.
Overall, the payoff of the analysts is maximal if they can ”read” behind the
earnings numbers. This is possible if they know the possible manipulation actions of
the manager and estimate the probability for these actions correctly. In equilibrium,
the analysts’ conjecture on the level of manipulation n = (n,n) must be correct.
Thus, in equilibrium analysts’ forecast errors occur only if the analysts updating
their beliefs rationally are unable to distinguish which state of ”true” earnings has
been realized, i.e. if they cannot distinguish whether the manager has manipulated
earnings up or down.
The strategies available to the analysts are given by the consensus forecast in
each period SA = (Ft ,Ft+1|Ft ∈ R,Ft+1 = (F t+1,F t+1)) where F t+1 is the analysts’
consensus forecast for Dt+1 given that Dt = Dt = x+ n and F t+1 is the analysts’
consensus forecast for Dt+1 given that Dt = Dt = x+n.
Using this notation and considering the information structure of the game, the
payoff of the analysts (3.5) is redefined as a function of the expected loss in period
t and t +1 as follows:
UA(Ft ,Dt ,Ft+1,Dt+1) = f
(
LA(Ft),LA(Ft+1)
)
(3.7)
their private information regarding the earnings prospects of the firms they cover. As non–strategic
players, investors are assumed to trust the information provided by the informed party and adjust the
price of the firm’s shares accordingly.
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where
LA(Ft ,Dt) =−p(Dt −Ft)2− (1− p)(Dt −Ft)2
and
LA(Ft+1,Dt+1) = −p(Dt+1−Ft+1)2− (1− p)(Dt+1−Ft+1)2
with
Dt = x+n
Dt = x+n
Dt+1 = x− [µ(x|Dt)n+(1−µ)(x|Dt)n]
Dt+1 = x− [µ(x|Dt)n+(1−µ)(x|Dt)n]
µ(x|Dt) is the posterior belief of the analysts that the reported earnings Dt are based
on the ”true” earnings x as defined in equation (3.6).
Analysts aiming to provide accurate forecasts are therefore most concerned with
estimating the manipulated part of earnings n and n. In period t, the analysts do not
have any other information besides the probability distribution of ”true” earnings.
The best analysts’ forecast in this period is therefore the mean of ”true” earnings
plus the expected manipulation where the expectations are based on the probability
distribution of the ”true” earnings. In period t + 1 the analysts are able to update
their beliefs regarding the manipulation done in the previous period. In this period,
their best forecast is therefore the mean of ”true” earnings minus the expected ma-
nipulation based on the posterior beliefs of the analysts formed after observing the
earnings reported in the period before. Formally, the analysts’ best response is:
F∗t = pDt +(1− p)Dt
= px+(1− p)x+ pn+(1− p)n (3.8)
and
F∗t+1 = pDt+1+(1− p)Dt+1
= px+(1− p)x− [µ(x|Dt)n+(1−µ)(x|Dt)n] (3.9)
The investors in our model do not behave strategically. They adopt the expecta-
tions of the analysts and determine the price of firm’s shares. At the end of period
t investors observe the earnings reported by the manager, compare them with the
analysts’ forecasts and build expectations regarding the future reported earnings,
which are assumed to be equivalent to the expectations of the analysts. Thus, in
dependence on the ”true” earnings realization in period t, the prices of companies’
share in period t and t +1 are either
Pt = Dt +δF t+1+ v(Dt −Ft) (3.10)
and
Pt+1 = Dt+1+ v(Dt+1−F t+1) (3.11)
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or
Pt = Dt +δF t+1+ v(Dt −Ft) (3.12)
and
Pt+1 = Dt+1+ v(Dt+1−F t+1) (3.13)
The strategy space of the manager is defined over the manipulated part of the
reported earnings in each state of ”true” earnings that realizes in period t, i.e. SM =
(m,m) ∈ [mmin,mmax]. This manipulation determined the level of reported earnings
in period t and t+1 since the ”true” earnings are predefined and constant over time.
The manager’s payoff is defined in (3.4). More specifically, manager’s payoff is
UM = (UM(.),UM(.)) in dependence on the ”true” earnings realization in period t,
where
UM(Dt ,Ft ,Ft+1) = (1−θ)Pt(Dt ,F t+1,Ft)+θδEMt Pt+1(Dt+1,F t+1) (3.14)
respectively
UM(Dt ,Ft ,Ft+1) = (1−θ)Pt(Dt ,F t+1,Ft)+θδEMt Pt+1(Dt+1,F t+1) (3.15)
with price functions Pt = (Pt ,Pt) and Pt+1 = (Pt+1,Pt+1) as defined in (3.10),
(3.11), (3.12) and (3.13).
Using the players’ strategy spaces and payoffs listed above, we define two equi-
libriums. In the first equilibrium, each player takes the action of the other players
as given and chooses the strategy that maximizes the payoff. This is summarized in
the following definition.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). The strategy profile (m∗,n∗,F∗t ,F∗t+1,P
∗
t ,P
∗
t+1)with m
∗=
(m∗,m∗), n∗ = (n∗,n∗), F∗t+1 = (F
∗
t+1,F
∗
t+1), P
∗
t = (P
∗
t ,P
∗
t ) and P
∗
t+1 = (P
∗
t+1,P
∗
t+1)
together with the posterior beliefs µ of the analysts about the state of ”true” earn-
ings in period t is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) if:
1. µ is determined by Bayes rule as in (3.6) whenever Dt = (x+m,x+m),
2. P∗t = D
∗
t +δF
∗
t+1+ v(D
∗
t −F∗t )
P∗t+1 = D∗t+1+ v(D
∗
t+1−F∗t+1)
P∗t = D∗t +δF∗t+1+ v(D
∗
t −F∗t )
P∗t+1 = D
∗
t+1+ v(D
∗
t+1−F∗t+1)
3. For all Ft ,Ft+1 ∈ SA
UA(F∗t ,F
∗
t+1;D
∗
t ,D
∗
t+1)≥UA(Ft ,Ft+1;D∗t ,D∗t+1)
where the function UA(.) is defined as in (3.7)
4. For all m ∈ SM
UM(D∗t ,D
∗
t+1;F
∗
t ,F
∗
t+1)≥UM(Dt ,Dt+1;F∗t ,F∗t+1)
where the function UM(.) is defined as in (3.14) and in (3.15) and
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5. m∗ = n∗ respectively m∗ = n∗.
In the second equilibrium concept, we consider the possibility that the manager
is allowed to talk to the analysts and communicate her view on the next period earn-
ings that she is going to report. Such statements summarized in earnings estimates
are known as earnings guidance. They are relevant for the manager’s incentives
to manipulate earnings for several reasons. First, earnings guidance influences the
consensus forecast since analysts need to adjust their expectations according to the
announced reporting strategy in order to minimize their mean forecasts errors, i.e.
n=m respectively n=m. Second, the manager providing earnings guidance would,
in equilibrium, anticipate the analysts’ reaction to her announcements and change
her reporting (manipulation) strategy accordingly. If the manager guides the an-
alysts, she solve a similar problem as the leader in Stackelberg’s leader–follower
game. The equilibrium in the setting with guidance is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium with Guidance). The strategy profile
(m∗,F∗t ,F∗t+1,P
∗
t ,P
∗
t+1) with m
∗ = (m∗,m∗), F∗t+1 = (F
∗
t+1,F
∗
t+1), P
∗
t = (P
∗
t ,P
∗
t ) and
P∗t+1 = (P
∗
t+1,P
∗
t+1) together with the posterior beliefs µ of the analysts about the
state of ”true” earnings in period t is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in pure strate-
gies) if:
1. µ is determined by Bayes rule as in (3.6) whenever Dt = {x+m,x+m},
2. P∗t = D
∗
t +δF
∗
t+1+ v(D
∗
t −F∗t )
P∗t+1 = D∗t+1+ v(D
∗
t+1−F∗t+1)
P∗t = D∗t +δF∗t+1+ v(D
∗
t −F∗t )
P∗t+1 = D
∗
t+1+ v(D
∗
t+1−F∗t+1)
3. For all m ∈ SM
UM(D∗t ,D
∗
t+1;EA(D∗t ),EA(D∗t+1))≥UM(Dt ,Dt+1;EA(D∗t ),EA(D∗t+1))
where the function UM(.) is defined as in (3.14) and in (3.15) and
EA(D∗t ) = px+(1− p)x+ pm∗+(1− p)m∗
EA(D∗t+1) = px+(1− p)x− [µ(x|D∗t )m∗+(1−µ)(x|D∗t )m∗]
3.7 Players’ Strategies in Equilibrium
The following analysis aims to show how the manipulation decision of the manager
depends on the market conditions, the manager’s compensation package and the
guidance provided by the manager to the firm’s outsiders. The market conditions
are defined with respect to the investors’ attitude towards earnings reports that are
above or below the analysts’ consensus forecast. The compensation package of the
manager may include either shares or stock options of the company. The manager
may or may not provide guidance to the analysts.
When analyzing the relevance of the market conditions, we distinguish two
cases. First, we consider a situation where the investors do not use the analysts’
forecasts as a reference point when determining the price of firm’s shares. We de-
note this situation by B for ”non–behavioral”. In this case, analysts’ forecasts are
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not a target that the manager aim to meet when deciding to manipulate earnings
since there is no premium the manager can get by reporting earnings at or above
the consensus forecast. Nevertheless, analysts’ expectations with respect to the ma-
nipulated part of earnings affect the price of the company shares since the investors
are supposed to adapt them fully and adjust the price of the firm’s shares accord-
ingly. In this case, the analysts are only information providers. Second, we consider
a situation where analysts are target setters and information providers at the same
time. We denote this situation by B for ”behavioral”. In this case, the analysts’ re-
ports and forecasts are used by investors not only to build expectations regarding the
manipulated part of earnings but also to determine whether the price of the firm’s
shares should include a premium (or a discount) from meeting (falling short of) the
consensus forecast.
The manipulation decision of the manager depends additionally on the man-
ager’s compensation package. We assume that the manager is compensated either
with company shares (S) or with stock options (C), which can be sold respectively
exercised in both periods. The percentage of shares respectively stock options
hold by the manager reflects her time preferences, which are assumed to be pri-
vate knowledge. If the manager holds stocks then her payoff is linked directly to
the market price of firm’s shares. In contrast, if the manager holds stock options
with an exercise price equal to the expected value of ”true” earnings, the payoff of
the manager is affected only if the price of the firm’s shares increases above the
fundamental value of the firm, i.e. the expected value of ”true” earnings.
The optimal reporting depends additionally on whether the manager does (G) or
does not guide (G). The difference is in the manager’s and analysts’ attitude toward
the actions of the other players. In particular, if the manager provides guidance, the
analysts would follow it in order to minimize their mean squared forecast errors.
The manager anticipates the reaction of the analysts’ and adjust her manipulation
strategy accordingly. If the manager does not provide any guidance, she cannot be
sure how the analysts will respond to her reporting and choose the manipulation
strategy that is best response to some forecast of the analysts.
In equilibrium, the manager’s reporting can be either revealing (R) or non–
revealing (R). The reporting is revealing if the firm’s outsiders are able to ”read”
behind the numbers and adjust their expectations in response to the manipulation
decision of the manager. The reporting is non–revealing if the firm’s outsiders can-
not update their beliefs even if they act as rational Bayesians. In the non–revealing
equilibrium, the firm’s outsiders can be systematically fooled.
3.7.1 Optimal Reporting of a Manager Playing with Behavioral and Non–
Behavioral Investors
Consider first the case where the manager holds shares (S), do not guide (G), and the
investors do not consider the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point when evaluating
the earnings reported by the manager, i.e. the function v(.) does not affect the
manager’s payoff, or (B). In this case, the manager does not have incentives to meet
the analysts forecasts so that her manipulation decision is driven only by her time
preferences θ and the time value of money δ. The following theorem proves this.
Theorem 1 (SBGR reporting). If θ ∈ [0; 11+δ), we obtain the following revealing
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equilibrium:
m∗ = m∗ = n∗ = n∗ = mmax,
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmax
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax,
P∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax),
P∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax),
P∗t+1 = x−mmax,
P∗t+1 = x−mmax
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategies).
If θ = 11+δ , we obtain the following revealing equilibrium:
m∗ = m∗ = n∗ = n∗ = 0,
F∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+(1− p)x,
P∗t = x+δ(px+(1− p)x),
P∗t = x+δ(px+(1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x,
P∗t+1 = x
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategies).
If θ ∈ ( 11+δ ,1], we obtain the following revealing equilibrium
m∗ = m∗ = n∗ = n∗ = mmin,
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmin
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin,
P∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin),
P∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin),
P∗t+1 = x−mmin,
P∗t+1 = x−mmin
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
The intuition is the following. If investors do not consider the analysts’ forecasts
as a reference point, the price of firm’s shares depends only on the present value of
the reported earnings, i.e. there is no premium (discount) for meeting (falling short
of) the analysts’ expectations. Thus, the manipulation decision of the manager can
be considered as a pure income shift over time depending on the time preferences of
the manager θ and the time value of money δ but not on the investors’ preferences
β with respect to earnings reports above or below the consensus forecast. The more
shares the manager aims to sell in the current (following) period, the stronger is her
incentive to manipulate earnings up (down) since the manipulation increases the
price of the shares that the manager is willing to sell in that period. In equilibrium,
the manager prefers to manipulate earnings in order to shift income according to
her time preferences although the analysts see this, adjust their expectations and
influence the present value of the firm’s earnings. The only case where the manager
does not have any incentives to manipulate earnings is when money does not have
any time value. This is the case where δ= 1 and the manager is indifferent between
holding shares in period t or in period t +1, i.e. θ = 12 .
To see how the manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings change with the
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market conditions, in the following we consider a situation where the investors re-
quire a discount for holding the shares of firms reporting earnings below the ana-
lysts’ expectations, i.e. if v(.) 6= 0 respectively if β > 1. In this case, the manager
has strong incentives to manipulate the earnings even if she is indifferent between
holding shares over both periods. In fact, it is this indifference that motivates the
manager to manipulate earnings as proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (SBGR reporting). If 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) < θ <
1
1+δ and p >
1
2 we obtain
the following non-revealing equilibrium:
m∗ = (1− p)(x− x),
m∗ = p(x− x),
F∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+(1− p)x,
P∗t = x+(1− p)(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)+ v(x+(1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t = x+ p(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)+ v(x+ p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x− (1− p)(x− x)+ v(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x− (1− p)(x− x)+ v(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)
P∗t+1 = x− p(x− x)+ v(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x− p(x− x)+ v(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ = p is a non–revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
The intuition for the existence of this equilibrium is the following. Given that
the ”true” earnings are above the consensus forecast, which is equal to the expected
”true” earnings in this equilibrium, the manager deciding not to manipulate earnings
reports a positive surprise in the current period and a positive or a negative surprise
in the period ahead. If, however, the manager sells shares in both periods, she has
incentives to ”save” the earnings in the current period reporting what the analysts
expect and use the ”savings” to cover losses that might occur in the next period,
when the ”true” earnings are below the consensus forecast. This is a better strategy
for the manager since reporting earnings below the consensus forecast is associated
with a price decline that cannot be compensated with a price increase following a
positive earnings surprise in the current period given that β > 1.
Similarly, if the ”true” earnings in the current period are below the consensus
forecast, the manager selling shares in both periods is better off if she ”borrow”
earnings from the next period than to report a loss by reporting truthfully for ex-
ample. This is because the price decline due to the negative surprise in the current
period is stronger than the price increase in the future when the ”true” earnings are
above the consensus forecast given that β > 1. Thus, because of the asymmetric
price reaction to earnings surprises reflected in the loss aversion parameter β > 1,
the expected payoff of the manager is higher if she ”borrows” earnings from the
future to prevent reporting negative earnings surprises in the current period and
”saves” earnings in the current period in order to prevent reporting negative sur-
prises in the future.
Note that this equilibrium exists only if β > 1. In other words, only if there
is a premium (discount) for meeting (falling short of) the analysts’ expectations,
the manager has incentives to manipulate earnings in order to meet the analysts’
forecasts so that in equilibrium her manipulation cannot be detected by the firm’s
outsiders. If β = 1, there is no manager who prefers to play this equilibrium.
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Overall, the higher the investors’ loss aversion, the higher is the manager’s in-
centives to choose this equilibrium. This is reflected in the restrictions for the man-
ager’s time preferences θ. The higher the parameter β reflecting investors’ loss
aversion, the lower is the lower bound of the parameter θ defining which managers
would choose to play this equilibrium. Outside the defined range the managers
prefer to follow a different strategy.
In the following we consider the extreme cases, where the manager can either
”save” earnings for the future and take the ”big bath”, i.e. m = m = mmin, or ”bor-
row” earnings from the future, i.e. m = m = mmax. If the manager decides to follow
one of these strategies, her reporting would be revealing since Dt 6= Dt in the sense
that the analysts would be able to detect the manipulation and adjust their beliefs
accordingly.
Theorem 3 (SBGR reporting). If condition (B.21) does not hold, we obtain the fol-
lowing revealing equilibria:
For θ ∈ [0, 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p))
m∗ = m∗ = mmax,
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmax,
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax,
P∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)+ v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)+ v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x−mmax+ v(x− px+(1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x−mmax+ v(x− px+(1− p)x)
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ ( (1+β)(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) ,1]
m∗ = m∗ = mmin,
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmin,
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin,
P∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)+ v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)+ v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x−mmin+ v(x− px+(1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x−mmin+ v(x− px+(1− p)x)
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
The results in the last two theorems show that the optimal reporting strategy of
the manager depends strongly on her time preferences θ as a function of the time
value of money δ, the distribution of true earnings p and the loss aversion of the
investors β. If the manager is interested in selling shares in the current and in the
following period, she has incentives to meet the analysts’ forecasts in the current
period as proved in the non–revealing equilibrium in Theorem 2. However, if the
manager desires to sell more shares in the current period for example, she would
”borrow” earnings from the future independently on the state of ”true” earnings. In
equilibrium, the analysts would adjust their consensus forecasts up by the amount
of the revenues the manager is able to shift over time, i.e. mmax. This action of
the analysts eliminates the price impact of the manipulation but the manager would
42
The Earnings Game with Behavioral Investors
still do it. This is because any other strategy is associated with a lower payoff
for the manager given the forecasts of the analysts and the time preferences of the
manager to sell more shares in the current period, so that in equilibrium the manager
manipulates the earnings up as expected by the analysts.
The same intuition applies in the case where the manager is more interested in
selling shares in period t + 1. In this case, the manager would ”save” earnings in
the current period, i.e. take the ”big bath” in order to increase the price of the firm
in the period when she plan to sell her shares. Again, in equilibrium the analysts
expect this and adjust their forecasts so that the manager does not get any premium
for manipulating the earnings. Nevertheless, the manager would not deviate from
this strategy since any other strategy is associated with a lower payoff given her
time preferences and the forecasts of the analysts.
To derive more general conclusions on the importance of the market conditions
for the manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings, assume that there are many
managers with equally distributed time preferences θ. Then, we can conclude based
on the previous analysis that the absolute level of manipulation in the economy is
lower if the investors consider the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point. This
results follows from the fact that in equilibrium where β > 1 there are some man-
agers playing the non–revealing equilibrium (SBGR), where the absolute level of
manipulation is per definition lower compared to the upper and lower bounds of
manipulation, chosen by the managers in the revealing equilibrium where there is
no premium (discount) for meeting (falling short of) the investors’ expectations
(SBGR). This is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of Managers Holding Shares and Play-
ing with Behavioral and Non–Behavioral Investors
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing shares (S), providing no guidance (G) under different market conditions
(B and B) in dependence on her time preferences θ. The points A = 11+δ ,
B= 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) , and C =
1+β
(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) represent bounds for the time
preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of a revealing (R)
or non–revealing (R) equilibrium proved in Theorem 1, 2 and 3.
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3.7.2 Optimal Reporting of a Manager Holding Stock Options
If the manager’s compensation package includes stock options instead of shares
her optimal reporting strategy changes since the manager’s payoff becomes a non–
linear function of the price of firm’s shares. To analyze the manager’s incentive to
manipulate earnings, we define θ is the percentage of stock options that the manager
desires to carry over to period t +1. Hence, 1−θ is the percentage of options that
the manager is allowed to exercise in period t.
Let Ct be the market value of a stock option with a strike equal to the mean
”true” earnings, px+(1− p)x, which is denoted by X . In particular,
Ct = max(Pt −X ,0) Ct = max(Pt −X ,0)
Ct+1 = max(Pt+1−X ,0) Ct+1 = max(Pt+1−X ,0) (3.16)
where Pt and Pt are determined by (3.10) respectively (3.12) and Pt+1 and Pt+1 are
determined by (3.11) respectively (3.13).
Again, in dependence on whether the analysts are in their role as target setters or
not, we distinguish two (revealing) equilibria. The first one summarizes the players’
strategies in equilibrium when the analysts are only information providers i.e. if
investors do not pay a premium (or require a discount) for meeting (falling short
of) the consensus forecast, i.e. v(.) = 0. The second one summarizes the players’
strategies in equilibrium when the analysts are also target setters, i.e. v(.) 6= 0.
Theorem 4 (CBGR reporting). If the manager holds stock options and v(.) = 0 we
obtain the following equilibrium
For θ ∈ ( 22+δ ;1]
m∗ = m∗ = mmin
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmin
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin
C∗t =C∗t = 0
C∗t+1 = x−mmin−X
C∗t+1 = x−mmin−X
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ [0, 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1)) and δ <
2(1−p)
3−2p
m∗ = m∗ = mmax
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmax
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax
C∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)−X
C∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)−X
C∗t+1 = 0
C∗t+1 = 0
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
To get an intuition on this result particularly in the context of the previous, recall
that the manager’s best strategy is to report truthfully if she holds shares, the time
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value of money is equal to zero and the manager is indifferent between selling shares
in period t or in period t+1 (see Theorem 1). Such indifference cannot make the no–
manipulation strategy attractive for the manager holding stock options because her
options become worthless if the next period ”true” earnings are low and there is no
earnings manipulation pushing the price up. Hence, if the manager is compensated
with stock options, she will never prefer to report truthfully in equilibrium.
Comparing the optimal manipulation strategies of the manager in dependence
on her compensation package, we can also conclude that there will be less ma-
nipulation in absolute terms in the economy if the managers in the economy are
compensated with options instead of shares. The reason for this is that options may
become worthless whereas the stock price may fall below the fundamentals but it
cannot become negative. Thus, the revealing manipulation strategies m =m =mmin
and m = m = mmax are attractive only for the manager with time preferences θ
that are shifted toward the period where the payoff is positive. More precisely, if
the manager’s payoff is positive in period t + 1 but equal to zero in period t, the
manager would prefer to sell in period t + 1. Such preferences are reflected in a
higher restriction on the parameter θ for a given manipulation strategy to be opti-
mal. For example, if we compare the restriction on θ for the equilibrium strategy
m = m = mmin, we can see that the manager holding shares follows this strategy if
her time preference parameter θ is lower than the time preference parameter θ of the
manager holding stock options, i.e. 11+δ <
2
2+δ (see Theorem 1 and 4). This means
that the latter follows the manipulation strategy mmin if she prefers to exercise her
options in period t + 1 instead of period t which is consistent with the observation
that with the strategy mmin, Ct = Ct = 0 but Pt > 0 and Pt > 0. In other words,
because the manager holding stock options carries the risk to get nothing for her
stock options in the current period, she would follow the strategy m = m = mmin
only if her time preferences are such that she can exercise more options in t + 1
with Ct+1 > 0 and Ct+1 > 0 than in t with Ct = Ct = 0 compared to the manager
holding shares where Pt > 0 and Pt+1 > 0.
Similar considerations apply when we compare the manager’s incentives to ma-
nipulate earnings in dependence on her compensation package for the case where
the manager chooses to play m=m=mmax. Since with this strategy Ct+1 =Ct+1 =
0 but Pt+1 > 0 and Pt+1 > 0, the manager holding stock options would follow the
strategy only if she has stronger incentives to exercise them in the current period
compared to the manager holding stocks. In particular, the strategy is optimal for
a manager holding options if she has a lower θ than a manager holding shares, i.e.
2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)
2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) <
1
1+δ (see Theorem 1 and 4). This is equivalent to the conclusion
that the absolute level of manipulation in the economy is lower if the managers in
that economy are compensated with options instead of shares.
Having derived conclusions on the implications of the manager’s compensation
on her manipulation strategies in equilibrium, we continue the analysis by consid-
ering the impact of the market conditions in the case that manager is compensated
with stock options. In particular, we are interested how the optimal manipulation
strategy of the manager holding stock options changes if investors are behavioral,
i.e. if they use the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point when evaluating earnings
reports. In the previous analysis focusing on a manager holding shares we have
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shown that a manager interested to sell shares in both periods prefers to manipulate
the earnings in order to meet the analysts’ forecasts. In the following, we analyze
the existence of this non–revealing equilibrium for the case that the manager holds
stock options.
Theorem 5 (CBGR reporting). If the manager holds stock options and θ∈ [ 44+3δp−2δp2 ,1]
then
m∗ = m∗ = mmin,
Ft = px+(1− p)x+mmin,
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin,
C∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)+ x− px− (1− p)x−X,
C∗t = 0,
Ct+1 = x−mminx− px− (1− p)x−X,
Ct+1 = 0
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
If investors are behavioral and the manager holds stock options instead of shares
then the no–manipulation strategy and the strategy of manipulating earnings in order
to meet the analysts’ forecasts are dominated strategies from the manager’s point of
view. Thus, in equilibrium the manager’s manipulation strategy is revealing.
To compare the absolute levels of manipulation in the economy with behavioral
and non–behavioral investors, we assume that δ > 2p−22p−3 so that the strategy m =
m=mmax is not an equilibrium strategy for the manager holding shares and playing
with non–behavioral investors (see Theorem 4).2 Since the restriction on θ for the
strategy m = m = mmin to be optimal for the manager playing with non–behavioral
investors, i.e. θ > 22+δ (see Theorem 4), is lower than the restriction on θ for the
manager playing with behavioral investors, i.e. θ > 44+3δp−2δp (see Theorem 5) for
all 0 < δ≤ 1 and 0≤ p≤ 1, we may conclude that there will be less manipulation
in the economy in absolute terms if the managers in that economy holding stock
options play with behavioral than with non–behavioral investors (see Figure 3.2).
In other words, the fact that the managers holding stock options play the earnings
game with investors considering the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point does
not increase the absolute level of manipulation in the economy compared to the
case with non–behavioral investors.
2This is a realistic assumption, since in the extreme case where p = 0 the requirement is that
δ > 2/3 which correspond to a maximum interest rate of 50%. The higher the probability p the less
binding is the restriction on δ.
46
The Earnings Game with Behavioral Investors
Figure 3.2: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Holding Stock Options
and Playing with Behavioral and Non–Behavioral Investors
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing stock options (C), providing no guidance (G) under different market con-
ditions (B and B) in dependence on her time preferences θ. The points
D = 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) , E =
2
2+δ , and F =
4
4+3δp−2δp2 represent bounds for the
time preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of the re-
vealing (R) equilibria proved in Theorem 4 and 5.
3.7.3 Optimal Reporting of a Manager Guiding Analysts
Having analyzed the earnings game with a manager endowed with discretion to ma-
nipulate the reported earnings numbers in dependence on the market conditions and
her compensation package, in this section we focus on the earnings game with a
manager providing earnings guidance to analysts. Studying the manager’s incen-
tives to manipulate earnings, we aim to answer the question whether the absolute
level of earnings manipulation increase when managers provide guidance compared
to the no–guidance case.
To answer this question we consider first an economy with non–behavioral in-
vestors and a manager holding shares. If the manager provides earnings guidance,
she indirectly announce how she is planning to shift earnings over time. Analysts
aiming to minimize the mean squared forecast errors would adjust their estimates
according to the provided guidance. The manager considers the best response of
the analysts, i.e. how they will respond to the announced guidance, and then she
picks a manipulation strategy that is a best response to the predicted response of
the analysts. In equilibrium, the analysts adjust their forecasts with the expected
manipulation as a response.
The following theorem formalizes the guidance effect on the manipulation de-
cision of the manager holding shares under the assumption that investors do not use
the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point, i.e. v(.) = 0.
Theorem 6 (SBGR reporting). If the manager guides the analysts and v(.) = 0, we
obtain the following equilibria:
For θ ∈ [0;1−δ],
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m∗ = m∗ = mmax,
F∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax,
P∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax),
P∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax),
P∗t+1 = x−mmax,
P∗t+1 = x−mmax
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
For θ = 11+δ ,
m∗ = m∗ = 0,
F∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+(1− p)x,
P∗t = x+δ(px+(1− p)x),
P∗t = x+δ(px+(1− p)x),
P∗t+1 = x,
P∗t+1 = x
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ (1−δ,1]\ 11+δ ,
m∗ = m∗ = mmin,
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmin,
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin,
P∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin),
P∗t = x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin),
P∗t+1 = x−mmin,
P∗t+1 = x−mmin
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
If the manager guides the analysts she has incentives to ”save” earnings for the
future, unless θ < 1− δ. This is because any earnings manipulation in the current
period is almost ”undone” by the analysts, so that the only price impact the man-
ager is able to achieve with the earnings manipulation is in period t + 1, when the
game ends. If δ = 1, i.e. if manipulation is completely ”undone” by the analysts,
every manager would follow this strategy independently on her time preferences. In
contrast, if the manager does not provide any guidance to the analysts with respect
to the earnings she is planing to report, the manager with time preferences θ < 11+δ
would choose to ”borrow” earnings from the future, i.e. m = m = mmax as proved
in Theorem 1. Both strategies are illustrated in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Holding Shares with
Guidance and No–Guidance
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing shares (S), providing guidance (G) or not (G) in dependence on her time
preferences θ. The points G= 1−δ and A= 11+δ represent bounds for the time
preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of the revealing
(R) equilibria proved in Theorem 1 and 6.
To make the difference in the manipulation policy of the manager more intuitive,
assume that the time value of money is equal to zero, i.e. δ = 1. Then, the manager
selling more shares in period t, i.e. θ < 12 , would manage earnings up, i.e. m = m =
mmax if she does not guide. The same manager would follow a different strategy if
she guides the analysts. This manager would anticipate that the analysts’ reaction
offsets the price effect of the earnings manipulation in the current period and decide
to ”save” earnings, i.e. m = m = mmin for the future instead. In both cases the
manager would report truthfully if she is indifferent between selling shares in the
current and the last period, i.e. θ = 12 .
Overall, if the manager holdings shares provides guidance to the analysts, the
absolute level of manipulation in the economy does not change. The effect of guid-
ance limits to more ”big baths” compared to the case where the manager does not
communicate her reporting plans.
In the following, we analyze the effect of guidance on the absolute level of
manipulation and the number of ”big baths” in the economy if the managers in that
economy hold stock options instead of shares.
Theorem 7 (CBGR reporting). If the manager holds stock options, v(.) = 0, and
guides the analysts we obtain the following equilibria.
For θ ∈ [ (2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX(2−p)(x−x)+δX ;1]
m∗ = m∗ = mmin
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmin
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin
C∗t =C∗t = 0
C∗t+1 = x−mmin−X
C∗t+1 = x−mmin−X
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and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ [0, 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) ] and δ < 2p−22p−3
m∗ = m∗ = mmax
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmax
F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax
C∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)−X
C∗t = x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)−X
C∗t+1 =C∗t+1 = 0
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0,1] is a revealing Bayesian equilib-
rium (in pure strategies).
Given that the analysts predict that the manager does not manipulate the earn-
ings, it is never optimal for the manager to do so, when she holds stock options
instead of shares. Thus, in equilibrium, the analysts would change their beliefs,
which again influence the present value of the firm’s earnings. The manager an-
ticipates that any manipulation is almost ”undone” in period t and would ”save”
earnings for the the future if she has stronger preferences to exercise options in
period t +1 compared to the case when she does not provide any guidance.
Therefore, in the case where the managers in the economy hold stock options
their decision to guide the analysts has two effects. First, there will be more man-
agers taking the ”big bath” compared to the case with no guidance. Second, the
absolute level of manipulation in the economy would increase. Both effects are
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Holding Stock Options
with Guidance and No–Guidance
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing stock options (C), providing guidance (G) or not (G) in dependence on her
time preferences θ. The points E = 22+δ and H =
(2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX
(2−p)(x−x)1δX represent
bounds for the time preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are
part of the revealing (R) equilibria proved in Theorem 1 and 6.
Having derived conclusions on the effect of guidance on the number of ”big
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baths” and the absolute level of manipulation in the economy, we focus now on
the effect of managers’ compensation when the managers in that economy guide.
We have already seen that the absolute level of manipulation in the economy is
lower if the managers providing no guidance are compensated with shares than with
stock options. The same conclusion holds also for managers providing guidance.
The absolute level of manipulation is lower if the managers are compensated with
stock options than with shares, since 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) < 1−δ<
(2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX
(2−p)(x−x)1δX (see
Theorem 6 and 7). Figure 3.5 illustrates the effect graphically.
Figure 3.5: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Providing Guidance and
Holding Shares or Stock Options
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing shares (S) or stock options (C) and providing guidance (G) in dependence
on her time preferences θ. The points A= 11+δ , D=
2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)
2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) , G= 1−δ,
and H = (2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX(2−p)(x−x)1δX represent bounds for the time preferences θ for which
the manipulation strategies are part of the revealing (R) equilibria proved in
Theorem 6 and 7.
3.8 Conclusion
The question whether and why managers manipulate earnings has been one of the
main research issues in several empirical and theoretical papers lately. Their main
point is that the managers’ manipulation decisions are basically motivated by the
investors’ response to earnings reports. This raises the question whether the man-
agers’ incentives to manipulate earnings change if firm’s outsiders behave strategi-
cally when observing the managers’ reporting decisions and determine the price of
the firm’s shares.
To analyze this problem we consider a three–period economy with one manager,
investors and analysts that interact strategically. The main objective of our model
is to support to derive conclusions on how the market conditions, the manager’s
compensation package and the manager’s guidance to analysts affect the manager’s
incentives to manipulate earnings and ultimately the absolute level of manipulation
in the whole economy. Based on the analytical results, we can derive the following
conclusions.
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When evaluating the relevance of the market conditions we distinguish two
cases. The first one is the case where investors consider analysts only as providers
of information regarding the next period earnings that the manager is reporting. The
second one is the case where investors are behavioral, i.e. they consider the analysts’
forecasts as a reference point when evaluating the earnings reported by the manager.
Our results show that whatever the compensation package of the managers, the fact
that the managers play the earnings game with behavioral investors does not in-
crease the absolute level of manipulation in the economy. The reason is that in the
case of behavioral investors and managers holding shares, some managers would
choose to manipulate the earnings in order to meet the analysts’ forecasts. This
manipulation is per definition lower than the minimum and maximum bounds of
manipulation representing earnings reserves that managers can shift over time. In
contrast, if the managers in the economy hold stock options, they would not choose
to meet the analysts’ forecasts in equilibrium. Instead, they would prefer to shift all
there earnings reserves over time. Since this strategy is optimal for less managers
when investors are behavioral compared to the case with non–behavioral investors,
we can conclude that the loss aversion of the investors does not motivate more man-
agers to shift their earnings reserves over time. In other words, the absolute level of
manipulation decreases if managers holding shares instead of stock options play the
earnings game with investors who are additionally averse against earnings reports
below the consensus forecast.
When assessing the impact of the managers’ compensation, we consider a man-
ager holding either shares or stock options. Independent on whether the investors
are behavioral or not, the absolute level of manipulation in the economy is lower
if the managers in the economy hold stock options than shares. The same conclu-
sion holds also if the managers in the economy provide guidance to analysts and
investors are non–behavioral.
The impact of guidance is studied in an economy with managers holding shares
and stock options. Independently on their compensation package, there are more
managers taking the ”big bath” if they guide the analysts compared to the case with
no guidance. Since this does not influence the overall level of manipulation in the
economy when managers hold stocks, there will be more manipulation if managers
hold stock options and guide the analysts compared to the case with no–guidance.
Overall, if regulators aim to reduce the absolute level of manipulation in an
economy, they should not try to motivate investors to focus only on the present value
of earnings. Instead, they should support the investors’ view that earnings reports
should be additionally evaluated relative to the consensus forecast, and managers
reporting earnings below it, should be punished by a stronger price decline com-
pared to managers beating the consensus by the same amount. When evaluating
the advantages and disadvantages of managers’ compensation packages, regulators
should also support managers compensation plan based on stock options instead of
shares. Ultimately, if the managers in the economy are compensated with stock op-
tions earnings guidance should be abolished by regulators since this increases the
absolute level of manipulation in the economy.
Our model can be extended in several aspects. First, it would be interesting to
see how the results change if we consider a strategic game without a final period.
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Second, it might be relevant to observe how the managers’ incentives to manipu-
late earnings change if investors behave strategically as well. Finally, introducing
other firms competing for the investors’ attention may also have interesting implica-
tions for the manipulation behavior of the managers in an economy with behavioral
investors.
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Managerial Guidance and Analysts’ Under-
reaction
4.1 Introduction
The question whether analysts’ expectations are rational has been subject of several
empirical studies.1 The main finding is that analysts’ forecasts can be biased and
inefficient with respect to variables in the information set of the analysts, including
previous forecast errors. If the analysts do not use all available information effi-
ciently when making forecasts, their forecast errors would be serially correlated.
Indeed, several studies on the statistical properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts
by Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Ali et al. (1992),
Lys and Sohn (1990) and Mendenhall (1991) find evidence that the forecast errors
of analysts are positively autocorrelated.
While from an empirical point of view the evidence on serially correlated fore-
cast errors is undisputable, its theoretical explanation remains controversial. Ex-
ploring the question why forecasters make systematic forecast errors some recent
studies consider the possibility that analysts underreact to information about fu-
ture earnings contained in previous earnings and price realizations. For example,
Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), and Ali et al. (1992) find evi-
dence that analysts underreact to earnings news by underestimating the persistence
of their earnings forecast errors. Further, Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell (1991),
and Ali et al. (1992) document that analysts’ forecast errors are related to past
changes in the stock prices, which indicates that analysts underreact to information
impounded in market prices.
This paper contributes to the literature seeking explanations for the analysts’ un-
derreaction by offering a rational economic explanation for their forecasting behav-
ior. We assume that analysts aiming to provide precise forecasts update their expec-
tations based on the managerial guidance regarding the future prospect of the firm.
This guidance is provided by managers aiming to reduce the short–term volatility
of their firm’s shares, mainly driven by the behavior of noise traders. Introducing a
random dynamical system compiling the demand of noise and fundamental traders
adopting the earnings expectations of the guided analyst, we show that managerial
1See Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2006) for a comprehensive overview on the analysts’ decision
process, the distribution of analysts’ forecasts, and the informativeness and efficiency of their output.
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guidance may increase the precision of the analysts’ forecasts. However, it may also
increase the effect estimated empirically as analysts’ underreaction. In particular,
if the manager provide guidance to analysts, their forecast errors will be positively
autocorrelated. The effect is expected to differ among firms with different exposure
to noise traders.
To estimate the differences in the guiding policies of the firms in our sample
we use the Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) approach suggested by Golan,
Judge and Miller (1996). The results suggest that the managers of growth firms
provide stronger guidance than the managers of value firms probably because the
impact of noise traders is stronger for growth than for value firms. In the context
of our model, this result implies that analysts forecasting the earnings of growth
firms have more precise forecasts than analysts following value firms. However,
their forecast are expected to be more inefficient due to the stronger guidance of the
growth firm managers.
Previous studies aiming at explain the analysts’ underreaction search for its ori-
gins in psychological biases in individual decision making. For example, Elliot,
Phalbrick, and Wiedman (1995) suggest that the observed underreaction of the an-
alysts is due to judgemental biases, which hinders analysts to revise their forecasts
sufficiently. Additionally, many experimental studies suggest circumstances where
psychological biases such as conservatism and anchoring cause analysts to under-
react (e.g. Maines and Hand 1996).
Other studies suggest incentive-based explanations. Based on the assumption
that analysts have an asymmetric loss function with respect to their forecasting ac-
curacy Raedy, Shane and Yang (2006) show that analysts maximizing their reputa-
tion restrain their forecast revisions so that analysts’ forecasts exhibit rationally an
underreaction to new information.
This work does not require analysts to be exposed to any behavioral biases nor
to have an asymmetric loss function, which is difficult to motivate. In our model,
the analysts’ underreaction is the result of the optimal guiding policy of managers
aiming at minimizing the short-term swings in the price of their firm’s shares. If the
analysts believe that the manager of the firm they follow has superior knowledge
about the future prospect of the firm, they will follow the guidance to increase the
precision of their forecast. The manager needs to guide the analysts and influence
the demand of fundamental traders in order to dampen the effect of noise traders.
Specifically, after price increases (decreases), the manager needs to guide the ana-
lysts’ expectations down (up) in order to decrease the volatility of the firm’s price.
Thus, when analysts update their forecasts in the light of increasing (decreasing)
prices their forecasts may be systematically lower (higher) than the earnings real-
izations. However, this inefficiency of the analysts’ forecasts is not irrational given
that it is the result of the optimal guiding policy of the manager to analysts aiming
to increase the precision of their forecasts.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides back-
ground on the determinants and impact of managerial guidance. Section 4.3 de-
scribes the model. Section 4.4 analyzes the impact of managerial guidance on the
analysts’ forecast errors in the context of our model. Section 4.5 describes the esti-
mation procedure used to calibrate the model. The estimation results are presented
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in section 4.7. Section 4.8 discuss the results in the context of our model and section
4.9 concludes.
4.2 Determinants and Impact of Managerial Guidance
Managers release information that is not required by regulatory standards. This
voluntary disclosure includes earnings estimates but also more general informa-
tion such as qualitative information about market conditions, trend information that
may affect the business, industry specific information, quantitative information on
business measures and assumptions, or forecasts of factors that may drive future
earnings. This information is usually disseminated in conference calls and has a
significant impact on the forecast errors of the analysts (see for example Bowen et
al., 2002). To the extent that such managers’ assessments on the future performance
of the firm affect the expectations of firm’s outsiders, they represent managerial
guidance.
To get an intuition on the managers’ incentives to guide firm’s outsiders, we con-
sider the evidence of surveys analyzing managers’ investors relations policies. For
example, Hsieh, Koller and Rajan (2005) show that executives attribute the benefits
of providing guidance to a higher valuation, lower volatility and improved liquid-
ity. In a larger survey conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI)
in Summer 2006, 62% of the surveyed 654 managers respond that they provide
guidance in order to decrease the volatility of the firm’s stock price.
The volatility of stock prices is driven by investors’ demand for firm’s shares. If
some investors trade on changes in fundamentals but others trade on pure noise, then
firm’s prices will be excessively volatile (see De Long et al., 1990). This volatility is
one of the main concern of firms’ managers. Thus, their guiding policy is expected
to be closely linked to the activities of noise traders on the stock market.
Price changes and thus stock price volatility is also closely linked to earnings
surprises. This relationship is evident in empirical studies on the prominent post-
earnings-announcement drift, i.e. the tendency of stock prices to drift in the same
direction as the earnings surprise. Thus, managers concerned with the volatility of
their stock prices need to focus on minimizing earnings surprises. This can be done
either by manipulating the reported earnings and/or by managing the expectations of
the analysts regarding the next period earnings. Here, we assume that the manager
of the firm focuses on guiding the analysts’ forecasts and does not manipulate the
reported earnings.
Several empirical studies show that managers are pretty successful in managing
the expectations of the analysts. In a recent study Cotter et al. (2006) explore
the timing and the extent of analysts’ reaction to public managerial guidance and
suggest a direct connection between the management information releases and the
analysts’ revision. Williams (1996) studies analysts’ forecast revisions in the month
before and in the month after the managers’ guidance and finds considerable level
of revisions in the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Earlier studies by Hassell, Jennings
and Lasser (1988) and Baginski and Hassell (1990) provide additional evidence that
analysts revise their estimates as a response to management forecasts.
The following section specifies the manager’s incentives to guide firm’s out-
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siders in a theoretical framework.
4.3 Model Setup
To analyze the manager’s incentives for guidance we model a simple economy with
one manager and many investors trading the shares of the firm. In the tradition of
Brock and Hommes (1998) we assume that some of the investors judge the prospects
of the firm based on its earnings potential (fundamental traders); the rest of the
investors make trading decisions based on past changes in the price of firm’s shares
(noise traders).
The manager can influence his firm’s market price only if he manages the expec-
tations of the fundamental traders. We assume that the fundamental traders update
their expectations based on the earnings estimates of the analysts following the firm.
Thus, to manage the market price of his firm’s shares a manager needs to influence
the expectations of the analysts regarding the next period earnings.
We specify the manager’s problem as a linear quadratic control problem con-
sisting of an objective function, a state equation describing the dynamics of firm’s
price changes and a feedback rule governing the guidance response of the managers
to previous firm’s price changes. In particular, we define the manager’s objective
function as
min
Gt
W = E
{
∞
∑
t=1
δtb(pt − pt−1)2
}
(4.1)
where Gt is a control variable describing manager’s guidance, pt is the price of
firm’s shares in period t, δt is a discount factor, and b > 0 is an unknown parameter
reflecting the manager’s preferences with respect to the variance of price changes.
The state equation describes the dynamics of the firm’s price changes. In our
model the market price of the firm is determined by the demand for firm’s shares,
which depends on the cumulative demand of the noise and fundamental traders. The
demand of the noise traders is driven by their expectations regarding the next period
price, which are defined as:
EN(pt+1− pt) = a(pt − pt−1) (4.2)
where a ≥ 0 is an unknown parameter describing the impact of previous price
changes on the traders’ demand for firm’s shares. In the following, we specify the
noise traders as positive feedback traders. This is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence that the autocorrelation of returns reverse in dependence on the volatility (see
Sentana and Wadhwani, 1992), which indicates the presence of positive feedback
traders on the market.
To the extend that the fundamental value of the firm depends on the present
value of the firm’s earnings, the expectations of the fundamental traders regarding
the next period price is determined by changes in their earnings expectations. The
latter are assumed to be driven by changes in the consensus forecast of the analysts
following the firm, i.e.
EF(pt+1− pt) = cEG(et+1− et) (4.3)
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The response of the fundamental traders to changes in the earnings expectations of
the analysts EG(.) is given by the parameter c > 0. If the analysts’ consensus fore-
casts increases (decreases) by a unit, the firm’s value estimated by the fundamental
traders increases (decreases) as well so that their overall demand for firm’s shares
increases (decreases) by c units.
We implement the market clearing through Walrasian tattonnement based on
the overall demand for firm’s shares given by (4.2) and (4.3). Using in addition the
assumption that analysts’ forecasts are subject to manager’s guidance as defined by
the function Gt , i.e.
EG(et+1− et) = Gt (4.4)
we get a dynamical system for the evolution of firm’s price changes through time
pt+1− pt = a(pt − pt−1)+ cG∗t + ε1t (4.5)
where ε1t ∼ N(0,σ2ε1t ) is a noise term and G∗t is a feedback or control rule. It
describes the optimal guidance response of the manager to price changes. It is
specified as
G∗t = g(pt − pt−1)+ ε2t (4.6)
where g is an unknown parameter and ε2t ∼ N(0,σ2ε2t ) is a noise term.
The manager’s control problem is therefore given by the manager’s objective
function
min
g∗
W = E
{
∞
∑
t=1
δtb(pt − pt−1)2
}
(4.7)
the state equation (4.5) and the feedback rule (4.6). Following Chow (1975), we get
that the optimal control reaches a steady–state in the sense of having Gt invariant
over time if
g∗ =−a
c
(4.8)
and
b =−h+δ(α+ cg)2h (4.9)
where h is a Lagrange multiplier. The first condition states that in steady–state,
the intensity of the manager’s guidance must neutralize the demand of the positive
feedback traders by changing the analysts’ consensus forecasts, i.e. the demand of
the fundamental traders. The second condition states the ”pain” that the manager
experiences facing the uncertainty in the price changes driven by positive feedback
traders while guiding the analysts. Both relations are used together with the state
equation (4.5) and the feedback rule (4.6) as consistency conditions to estimate the
unknown parameters of the model.
Note that in our economy with managers guiding the expectations of the funda-
mental investors, firms’ market prices are not predictable although there are some
positive feedback traders investing systematically. The activities of these noise
traders do not have any impact on the market prices, if the managers’ guidance is
optimal. Given the managers’ objective to minimize the variance of stock price
changes, their guidance needs to neutralize the impact of the positive feedback
traders on the market price of the firm. In this case, firms’ price changes will not be
correlated over time although there are positive feedback traders on the market.
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4.4 The Impact of Managerial Guidance on the Analysts’ Fore-
cast Errors
The specification of the manager’s guiding policy in the previous section allows us
to analyze its impact on the precision and the efficiency of the analysts’ earnings
forecasts.
By definition, the analysts’ forecast error is equal to:
zt = et −EG(et) (4.10)
or
zt = ∆et −EG(∆et) (4.11)
where ∆et := et − et−1.
Then, using equations (4.4) and (4.6), the forecast error of the analysts can also
be written as:
zt = ∆et −g(∆pt−1) (4.12)
where ∆pt−1 := pt−1 − pt−2. Thus, analysts following the managerial guidance
may increase the precision of their forecasts if the market price of the firm at the
time of the forecasting falls (increases) but the trend of earnings growth is positive
(negative).
Result 1. If the current market price of the firm goes into the opposite direction as
the earnings trend, the analysts following the managerial guidance produce lower
forecast errors.
Although the guidance of the manager may increase the precision of the analysts
forecasts, it has a negative impact on their efficiency. In the following we show that
analysts’ forecasts based on the guidance by managers are positively autocorrelated.
Forecast errors exhibit a positive autocorrelation if:
Et−1(ztzt+1) = Et−1(∆et −g∆pt−1)(∆et+1−g∆pt)> 0 (4.13)
or
Et−1(ztzt+1) = Et−1(∆et∆et+1)−Et−1(g∆et∆pt) (4.14)
−Et−1(g∆pt−1∆et+1)+Et−1(g2∆pt−1∆pt)> 0
We assume that the firm’s earnings follow a (seasonal) random walk with a drift,
i.e.
et = µ+ et−1+ εt (4.15)
where εt ∼ N(0,σε) is white noise.
The first term of the equation is equivalent to
Et−1(∆et∆et+1) = µ2
The second term of the equation is equivalent to
Et−1(g∆et∆pt) = gEt−1[∆et((a+ cg)∆pt−1+ εt1)] = g[µ(a+ cg)]∆pt−1 = 0
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given the optimal guidance policy g =−ac .
The third term of the equation is
Et−1(g∆pt−1∆et+1) = gµ∆pt−1
The last term is
g2∆pt−1Et−1(∆pt) = 0
since under optimal guiding Et−1(∆pt) = 0. Thus, the forecast errors are positively
autocorrelated if
Et−1(ztzt+1) = µ2−µg∆pt−1 > 0 (4.16)
This is true for − |µ||g| < ∆pt−1 < |µ||g| .
If we focus on stocks with a positive earnings drift, i.e. µ > 0, the analysts’
forecast errors will be positively autocorrelated, when firm’s prices increase as well.
For example, in a boom market when earnings tend to increase and the market price
of firm’s shares increase as well, managers need to guide analysts’ expectations
down. As a result, analysts’ forecasts will be systematically too low, i.e. the analysts
underreact. If the price of the firm decreases although the earnings drift is positive,
the managers need to guide the expectations of the analysts up in order to dampen
the effect of the positive feedback traders betting on further decreasing prices. This
guidance reduces the forecast error of the analysts as discussed above, but given that
the impact of the positive feedback traders is limited and there are no large negative
shocks in the economy so that the optimal guidance is not that strong, analysts’
forecasts will be too low again. Thus, analysts’ following the managerial guidance
would have positively correlated forecast errors.
Result 2. There is a positive autocorrelation in the analysts’ forecast errors if there
is a price change supporting the earnings trend. If this condition does not hold,
the forecast errors of the analysts will be positively autocorrelated if the positive
feedback traders do not dominate the market so that the manager does not need to
guide too strongly.
Note that if positive feedback traders dominate the market, then the manager
needs to guide stronger when prices decline. Consequently, the analysts’ forecasts
may increase above the mean earnings growth, i.e. the analysts’ forecast will be
too high. Given the positive forecast error in the previous period, analysts’ forecast
errors will then exhibit a negative autocorrelation.
In the literature, the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and previous
realizations of variables known by the analysts is used as an indicator for inefficient
forecasting. Several empirical studies analyzing the properties of analysts forecasts
find a significant positive relationship between the analysts’ forecast errors and the
firm’s performance and also between the analysts’ forecast errors in two subsequent
periods (see Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Ali, Klein
and Rosenfeld, 1992; Lys and Sohn, 1990 and Mendenhall, 1991). A common ex-
planation for this empirical result is that the analysts underreact to information, i.e.
analysts’ systematically underestimate the trend in the firm’s performance proba-
bly because of some behavioral bias. As a consequence, after a positive (negative)
firm’s performance the forecast error is positive (negative). The same relationship
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can be observed in our model as well: If the firm’s performance has a positive (neg-
ative) trend, the forecast error of the analysts will be positive (negative) when the
current price change supports the development of the firm’s performance or if the
current price decreases (increases) but only moderately, for example because of the
limited impact of positive feedback traders. Note that our explanation of the ob-
served relationship does not require analysts to be exposed to any behavioral bias.
In our model, the relationship is observed because managers provide guidance to
firm’s outsiders in order to dampen the effect of the positive feedback traders in-
creasing the variance of firm’s price changes.
To estimate whether the proposed relationship can be explained by managerial
guidance, we study the price dynamics of different firms in order to recover the un-
known parameters of the problem along with the parameter of the feedback rule. We
expect to see significant differences in the preferences and in the guiding policies of
firms with different levels of uncertainty in their earnings and price growth. Such
differences can be observed for example by growth and value stocks. To the extent
that earnings are uncertain and the firm is difficult to be evaluated on the basis of
fundamentals, there will be more investors evaluating the firm on the basis of its
past performance. According to our model, the managers of such firms would have
stronger incentives to provide guidance since it reduces the impact of the positive
feedback traders on the variance of stock price changes. The implications for the
analysts’ forecasts is then analyzed in the context of our model.
4.5 Estimation Procedure
To estimate the unknown parameters of the model we propose the use of the Gener-
alized Maximum Entropy (GME) estimation method as described by Golan, Judge
and Miller (1996). The basic objective of the method is to estimate the unknown
parameters with minimal distributional and sampling assumptions. This objective
is similar in philosophy to other approaches as for example the Generalized Method
of Moments, where the basic objective is first to search for the ”natural weight” of
each observation and then to use it in order to form an empirical likelihood based on
some moments. In contrast, the GME does not use any moments or side–conditions
a priori. Instead with the GME one maximizes the traditional entropy functional but
subject to noisy moment representations, without imposing any sampling assump-
tions or zero moment conditions.
The principle of maximum entropy is based on the idea that when estimating the
probability distribution of the model parameters from a sample one should select
the distribution, which leaves the largest remaining uncertainty (maximum entropy)
consistent with some constrains. Under this criterion, there are no additional as-
sumptions or biases introduced in the estimation. Additionally, the estimation can
be done without imposing assumptions on the underlying data generation process.
Thus, given the linear-quadratic model in (4.7), (4.5) and (4.6), we estimate the un-
known parameters without imposing assumptions regarding the exact relationship
between sample and population moments. Assuming that the parameters and the
noise terms with unknown distributions are both unknown, we aim to recover them
simultaneously from the price data of a particular firm.
To achieve this goal we reformulate the unknown parameters and noise terms
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as discrete random variables with finite supports. Accordingly, we may write the
control problem in terms of the random variables. The estimation problem is then
to recover the probability distributions for the unknown parameters and noise terms
that reconciles the available information with the observed sample information. At
the optimum, the probabilities satisfy some consistency constraints, which are given
by the state equation (4.5), the feedback rule (4.6) and the steady–state conditions
(4.8) and (4.9). Given these probability distributions and the supports used in the
estimation we can recover the parameters of the model. A precise description of the
estimation procedure is given in the appendix.
4.6 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To recover the unknown parameters of the linear quadratic control problem de-
fined in (4.1), (4.5) and (4.6) for different firms, we use quarterly price data from
Datasteam starting in the third quarter of 2000 and ending at the fourth quarter of
2006. We choose the third quarter of 2000 as a starting date since in October 2000
the SEC introduced the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) prohibiting the private
dialogue between managers and analysts. We expect that after Reg FD, the market
reaction to earnings forecasts and announcements changes since the dissemination
of information is intensified. Previous research by Heflin et al. (2003) support this
view. They observe that after Reg FD the return volatility after earnings announce-
ments, which is part of the manager’s objective function, has decreased. This result
indicates that the effect of managers’ guidance may differ prior and after Reg FD.
We take this into account by focusing on the period after Reg FD.
We limit our analysis to firms that usee US GAAP reporting standard and choose
40 firms included in the S&P 500 Index. The selection is done based on two criteria:
the firms’ market capitalization as of December 2006 and the firms’ fundamentals
relative to their market value. We focus on the largest firms in the index to keep
the group homogenous with respect to size since large firms are usually covered by
more analysts than small and mid–cap firms. The market capitalization of the firms
in our sample ranges between 34$ billions and 422$ billions.
To distinguish whether a firm is a value or a growth firm, we use the S&P500/Citigroup
Growth and Value Indices. The main advantage of these indices is that firms’ clas-
sification is based not only on the price-to-book ratios of the firms but also on addi-
tional variables.2
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics on the quarterly price changes of the
growth firms included in our sample.
2The growth criteria are the five-years historical earnings per share growth rate, sales per share
growth rate and the five years average annual internal growth rate. The value criteria are the book
value per share to price, the sales per share to price, the cash flow per share to price, and the dividend
yield.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics Growth Stocks
The summary statistics are calculated for changes in quarterly prices. For the time
period from Q1 2002 to Q4 2006 there are 26 observations. Mean and median
values in italic are statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic is performed for an intercept and a
trend with maximum 5 lags. The p–values are reported in parenthesis.
Mean Median StDev Skew. Kurt. JB-stat ADF-test
AIG -0.378 -0.035 9.064 0.002 1.929 1.242 (0.538) -6.199 (0.000)
Am.Express 0.414 1.865 4.488 -0.921 3.527 3.976 (0.137) -4.636 (0.006)
Amgen 0.812 -0.725 8.654 0.725 3.569 2.628 (0.269) -6.832 (0.000)
Cisco -1.604 0.070 6.749 -1.823 6.411 27.02 (0.000) -4.765 (0.004)
Comcast -0.067 0.175 4.402 -0.449 2.499 1.145 (0.564) -4.693 (0.005)
Dell 1.173 1.860 3.290 -0.145 3.126 0.109 (0.947) -6.017 (0.000)
EBay 0.496 0.013 5.668 -0.168 2.222 0.779 (0.677) -1.004 (0.922)
Exxon 1.173 1.860 3.290 -0.145 3.126 0.109 (0.947) -6.017 (0.000)
HomeDepot -0.862 0.445 6.838 -1.222 4.189 8.008 (0.018) -6.489 (0.000)
IBM -0.805 0.715 11.093 -0.349 3.100 0.538 (0.764) -5.549 (0.001)
J&J 1.026 1.233 5.059 -1.037 4.703 7.801 (0.020) -6.695 (0.000)
Lowe’s 0.629 0.045 3.162 0.256 2.050 1.262 (0.532) -4.699 (0.007)
Medtronic -0.154 0.285 4.270 -0.616 3.216 1.694 (0.429) -7.072 (0.000)
Oracle -0.737 0.119 3.536 -1.623 6.110 21.90 (0.000) -6.757 (0.000)
Pepsico 1.008 1.255 4.199 -0.993 4.865 8.040 (0.018) -6.861 (0.000)
P&G 1.201 1.123 3.123 -0.045 2.774 0.064 (0.969) -4.663 (0.007)
Un.Health 1.542 1.983 3.291 -0.756 5.551 9.530 (0.009) -4.608 (0.006)
Walgreen 0.532 0.760 3.921 -0.112 2.996 0.054 (0.973) -5.767 (0.000)
Wal Mart -0.340 -0.420 5.817 -0.293 2.687 0.479 (0.787) -9.716 (0.000)
Yahoo -1.452 -0.407 9.075 -3.373 15.479 217.9 (0.000) -5.109 (0.002)
The average firms’ price changes range between -1.6 and 1.5 with standard de-
viations between 3.1 and 11.1. The skewness and kurtosis range between -3.4 and
0.7 respectively between 1.9 and 15.5 indicating that the price changes of some
firms are probably not normal distributed. However, the JB-statistic shows that the
price changes of most of the firms are not statistically different from the normal
distribution. Further, firms’ price changes do not have a unit root according to the
ADF-statistic except for one firm. This allows us to use ordinary least squares to es-
timate the autocorrelation of firms’ price changes. The results reported in Table 4.2
suggest that price changes of most of the growth firms in our sample do not depend
on their previous realizations. Including higher lags in the analysis does not change
the conclusion that firms’ quarterly price changes are not autocorrelated over time.
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Table 4.2: Autocorrelation in Price Changes of Growth Stocks
pt − pt−1 = c0+∑3i=0 ci(pt−i− pt−i−1).
The Breusch–Godfrey (BG) statistic is calculated with 3 lags. P–values are
reported in parenthesis.
c0 c1 c2 c3 BG-test
AIG -1.781 (0.350) -0.383 (0.117) -0.210 (0.349) -0.007 (0.975) 0.449 (0.772)
Am.Express 0.639 (0.492) 0.072 (0.729) -0.084 (0.684) 0.255 (0.227) 2.477 (0.099)
Amgen 0.505 (0.762) -0.105 (0.637) 0.074 (0.737) -0.366 (0.085) 0.917 (0.455)
Cisco -0.248 (0.829) 0.170 (0.407) 0.423 (0.021) -0.345 (0.056) 2.392 (0.107)
Comcast -0.263 (0.780) 0.083 (0.726) -0.146 (0.519) -0.256 (0.252) 0.255 (0.856)
Dell 0.848 (0.279) 0.048 (0.838) 0.293 (0.181) 0.075 (0.733) 0.338 (0.798)
EBay 0.785 (0.561) -0.234 (0.312) -0.090 (0.730) 0.248 (0.368) 2.787 (0.074)
Exxon 0.848 (0.279) 0.048 (0.838) 0.293 (0.181) 0.075 (0.733) 0.338 (0.798)
HomeDepot -0.507 (0.710) -0.292 (0.216) -0.041 (0.846) -0.038 (0.846) 0.280 (0.839)
IBM -0.922 (0.656) 0.002 (0.993) -0.233 (0.233) 0.141 (0.481) 0.095 (0.962)
J&J 1.318 (0.244) -0.260 (0.276) 0.082 (0.741) -0.270 (0.255) 0.623 (0.610)
Lowe’s 1.140 (0.163) -0.431 (0.077) 0.019 (0.942) -0.024 (0.915) 3.228 (0.050)
Medtronic -0.321 (0.732) -0.446 (0.065) -0.167 (0.513) -0.019 (0.939) 1.722 (0.203)
Oracle -0.219 (0.794) -0.027 (0.905) 0.375 (0.092) -0.077 (0.738) 12.22 (0.000)
Pepsico 1.250 (0.183) -0.433 (0.074) -0.211 (0.398) 0.004 (0.984) 0.304 (0.822)
P&G 1.903 (0.032) -0.366 (0.141) -0.320 (0.187) 0.022 (0.923) 5.368 (0.009)
Un.Health 1.124 (0.376) -0.001 (0.996) 0.032 (0.893) 0.130 (0.693) 1.146 (0.361)
Walgreen 0.431 (0.574) -0.269 (0.231) 0.031 (0.882) -0.354 (0.091) 1.368 (0.288)
Wal Mart -0.166 (0.855) -0.758 (0.005) -0.078 (0.765) 0.099 (0.615) 0.486 (0.697)
Yahoo 0.540 (0.364) 0.189 (0.406) 0.244 (0.006) -0.061 (0.443) 0.824 (0.500)
Summary statistics for the value firms are provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Value Stocks
The summary statistics are calculated for changes in quarterly prices. For the time
period from Q1 2002 to Q4 2006 there are 26 observations. Mean and median
values in italic are statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic is performed for an intercept and a
trend with maximum 5 lags. The p–values are reported in parenthesis.
Mean Median StDev Skew. Kurt. JB-stat ADF-test
AT&T -0.408 -0.57 3.85 0.658 4.458 4.179 (0.124) -5.216 (0.002)
Bank of America 1.049 1.365 2.528 -0.400 3.039 0.694 (0.707) -6.170 (0.000)
Bristol Myers -0.935 -0.183 5.528 -0.479 5.034 5.480 (0.065) -5.207 (0.003)
Citigroup 0.221 0.365 4.494 -0.858 4.742 6.476 (0.039) -5.422 (0.001)
ConocoPhilips 1.462 1.175 3.675 0.095 3.645 0.490 (0.783) -3.683 (0.043)
Duke Energy 0.105 0.980 4.749 -1.147 6.285 17.39 (0.000) -5.487 (0.001)
Du Pont -0.231 -0.363 3.407 -0.272 2.489 0.603 (0.740) -6.489 (0.000)
Fannie Mae -0.224 -1.075 7.392 0.571 3.478 1.661 (0.436) -7.080 (0.000)
Hewlett Packert -0.590 -0.015 5.198 -0.653 3.025 1.847 (0.397) -6.318 (0.000)
JPMorgan Chase -0.184 -0.060 5.296 -0.154 4.087 1.383 (0.501) -3.948 (0.029)
Merck -0.867 0.533 6.621 0.105 3.150 0.072 (0.965) -4.987 (0.003)
Merrill Lynch 1.257 3.390 8.035 -0.063 1.843 1.467 (0.480) -5.598 (0.001)
Morgan Stanley -0.093 0.735 8.146 -0.709 3.589 2.551 (0.279) -4.437 (0.010)
Motorola -0.385 0.330 3.881 -2.025 8.125 46.22 (0.000) -8.236 (0.000)
Sprint Nextel -1.429 -0.472 4.824 -2.162 7.558 42.75 (0.000) -4.453 (0.008)
Time Warner -1.583 -0.660 4.776 -0.195 2.719 0.250 (0.882) -3.752 (0.042)
Tyco -0.727 0.025 6.785 -1.750 6.867 29.47 (0.000) -3.865 (0.030)
Verizon -0.948 -0.050 5.099 -0.967 4.515 6.539 (0.038) -6.103 (0.000)
Washington Mut. 0.965 1.645 3.852 -0.753 3.253 2.529 (0.282) -6.629 (0.000)
Wells Fargo 0.571 0.763 1.650 0.011 2.351 0.457 (0.796) -6.198 (0.000)
The average price changes of the value firms range between -1.6 and 1.5 with
standard deviations between 1.6 and 8.1. The skewness and kurtosis range between
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-2.2 and 0.7 respectively between 1.8 and 8.1 indicating that the price changes of
some firms are probably not normal distributed. However, most of the value firms
have price changes that are statistically not different from the normal distribution ac-
cording to the JB-statistic. Further, according to the ADF-statistic, the price changes
of the value firms included in our sample do not have a unit root. This allows us
to use ordinary least squares to estimate the autocorrelation of firms’ price changes.
The results reported in Table 4.4 suggest that as in the case of growth firms the price
changes of most of the value firms in our sample do not depend on their previous
realizations. Including higher lags in the analysis does not change the conclusion
that firms’ quarterly price changes are not autocorrelated over time.
Table 4.4: Autocorrelation in Price Changes of Value Stocks
pt − pt−1 = c0+∑3i=0 ci(pt−i− pt−i−1).
The Breusch–Godfrey (BG) statistic is calculated with 3 lags. P–values are
reported in parenthesis.
c0 c1 c2 c3 BG-test
AT&T 0.296 (0.617) 0.437 (0.023) 0.017 (0.906) 0.418 (0.007) 0.758 (0.534)
Bank of America 1.717 (0.033) -0.331 (0.182) -0.059 (0.816) -0.021 (0.924) 2.696 (0.081)
Bristol Myers -0.956 (0.361) 0.538 (0.025) -0.410 (0.042) 0.196 (0.300) 0.841 (0.491)
Citigroup -0.039 (0.970) -0.094 (0.684) -0.097 (0.675) -0.004 (0.987) 0.453 (0.719)
ConocoPhilips 0.752 (0.436) 0.312 (0.196) 0.021 (0.925) 0.109 (0.630) 0.396 (0.758)
Duke Energy -0.261 (0.776) -0.022 (0.925) 0.356 (0.074) -0.140 (0.493) 1.139 (0.363)
Du Pont -0.010 (0.987) -0.554 (0.028) -0.479 (0.047) -0.245 (0.263) 0.732 (0.548)
Fannie Mae -1.152 (0.371) -0.415 (0.083) 0.200 (0.298) 0.196 (0.292) 0.124 (0.944)
Hewlett Packert 0.681 (0.445) -0.089 (0.688) 0.285 (0.127) 0.223 (0.211) 1.778 (0.192)
JPMorgan Chase -0.198 (0.836) 0.138 (0.477) 0.153 (0.388) 0.037 (0.836) 1.642 (0.219)
Merck -1.709 (0.270) -0.014 (0.955) -0.054 (0.798) -0.156 (0.459) 0.416 (0.744)
Merrill Lynch 0.457 (0.798) -0.03 (0.899) -0.093 (0.700) 0.126 (0.585) 2.819 (0.072)
Morgan Stanley 0.162 (0.915) 0.166 (0.495) 0.352 (0.097) -0.177 (0.395) 3.195 (0.052)
Motorola 0.331 (0.561) -0.066 (0.779) 0.302 (0.041) 0.047 (0.761) 1.48 (0.258)
Sprint Nextel 0.026 (0.962) -0.149 (0.519) 0.057 (0.750) 0.145 (0.282) 0.589 (0.631)
Time Warner -0.681 (0.501) 0.177 (0.376) 0.265 (0.165) 0.105 (0.578) 2.474 (0.099)
Tyco -1.253 (0.417) 0.277 (0.226) -0.141 (0.545) 0.007 (0.975) 1.265 (0.320)
Verizon -0.664 (0.553) -0.111 (0.647) 0.005 (0.982) -0.018 (0.929) 1.067 (0.391)
Washington Mut. 0.771 (0.368) -0.450 (0.048) -0.006 (0.977) -0.005 (0.981) 1.918 (0.167)
Wells Fargo 0.932 (0.032) -0.332 (0.118) -0.255 (0.261) -0.287 (0.196) 0.201 (0.894)
The missing autocorrelation of price changes of growth and value stocks is con-
sistent with our model since optimal guidance neutralizes the effect of the positive
feedback traders on the price dynamics of the firm. If the manager of the firm does
not intervene against the activities of positive feedback traders, we would observe
a positive autocorrelation of stock price changes. The autocorrelation would be
negative if the guidance is too strong relative to the impact of the positive feedback
traders on stock prices. Both guiding policies cannot be considered as rational given
the manager’s control problem.
4.7 Estimation Results
The estimation procedure described in section 4.5 and in the appendix is applied to
estimate the unknown parameters of the optimal control problem that the managers
of different value and growth firms need to solve when deciding their guiding strate-
gies. The GME approach requires to specify the support of each of the unknowns
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in order to reflect prior knowledge about the parameters. Since our model does not
provide specific restrictions on the upper and lower bounds on the parameter space,
we run the estimation for a variety of plausible bounds. For each combination of
bounds we estimate the coefficients and calculate the corresponding entropy.
We choose six supports in equidistant fashion for each of the parameters subject
to estimation. We first use broad supports and then refine them while evaluating
changes in the corresponding entropy. For the parameter a we choose the supports
za = (0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9,1.0)
za = (0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2,0.25,0.3)
za = (0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,1.0)
The parameter g is estimated over the supports
zg = (−1,−0.9,−0.7,−0.5,−0.3,−0.1)
zg = (−0.3,−0.25,−0.2,−0.15,−0.1,−0.05)
zg = (−1,−0.8,−0.7,−0.6,−0.5,−0.4)
For the parameters b and h we use the supports
zb = (0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9,1)
zb = (0.5,1,1.5,2,2.5,3)
zh = (−1,−0.9,−0.7,−0.5,−0.3,−0.1)
zh = (−3,−2.5,−2,−1.5,−1,−0.5)
The supports for both noise terms are chosen symmetrically around zero, i.e.
ve = (−0.5,−0.25,−0.1,0.1,0.25,0.5)
The parameter c reflecting the demand response of the fundamental traders to the
earnings estimates of the guided analysts is set to be equal to 1. This assumption is
not restrictive given that the manager knows how the fundamental traders respond to
the provided guidance. In this case the manager can adjust his guidance policy cap-
tured by the parameter g and take into account the expectations of the fundamental
traders in order to influence the next period price.
Combining the different support sets, we get eighteen different coefficient esti-
mates with corresponding entropies for each firm in the sample. The coefficients
estimates with the lowest entropy for the growth and value stocks in our sample are
reported in Table 4.5 respectively in Table 4.6.3 For focus is on the coefficients g
and b since according to the steady–state conditions of the problem and the assump-
tion that c = 1, a =−g and h =−b.
The estimated coefficients for the growth and value stocks are reported in Ta-
bles 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the estimation results
graphically.
3The full sample of estimates is available upon request.
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Table 4.5: Coefficient Estimates for Growth Stocks
g b H
AIG -0.205 0.500 1.153
American Express -0.282 0.227 4.197
Amgen -0.057 0.776 3.718
Cisco -0.057 0.776 6.015
Comcast -0.300 0.744 6.450
Dell -0.429 0.774 5.226
EBay -0.282 0.227 7.841
Exxon -0.100 0.752 1.514
Home Depot -0.225 0.282 5.026
IBM -0.208 0.500 3.386
J&J -0.057 0.752 5.724
Lowe’s -0.192 0.500 6.446
Medtronic -0.429 0.772 7.333
Oracle -0.150 0.776 6.554
Pepsico -0.225 0.500 6.824
P&G -0.100 0.752 4.911
United Health -0.434 0.752 4.833
Walgreen -0.220 0.500 7.201
Wal Mart -0.438 0.752 5.637
Yahoo -0.205 0.500 3.509
Mean -0.230 0.606
Median -0.214 0.748
St.Dev. 0.127 0.196
Table 4.6: Estimated Coefficients for Value Stocks
g b H
AT&T -0.050 0.205 3.386
Bank of America -0.100 0.776 6.047
Bristol Myers -0.500 1.042 3.875
Citigroup -0.411 0.752 3.682
ConocoPhilips -0.100 0.227 8.608
Duke Energy -0.300 0.773 4.745
Du Pont -0.057 0.764 4.559
Fannie Mae -0.050 0.227 3.773
Hewlett Packert -0.100 0.773 1.832
JPMorgan Chase -0.196 0.500 6.565
Merck -0.400 0.201 4.367
Merrill Lynch -0.200 0.720 1.337
Morgan Stanley -0.057 0.772 6.486
Motorola -0.427 0.774 9.796
Sprint Nextel -0.050 0.205 8.340
Time Warner -0.050 0.213 9.461
Tyco -0.100 0.500 7.804
Verizon -0.057 0.776 4.319
Washington Mutual -0.300 0.683 4.103
Wells Fargo -0.192 0.500 8.522
Mean -0.178 0.554
Median -0.100 0.702
St.Dev. 0.154 0.280
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Figure 4.1: Estimated Guidance Policies of Growth and Value Stocks
The box portion of the boxplot represents the first and third quartiles. The median is de-
picted using a line through the center of the box, while the mean is drawn using a symbol.
The shaded region displays approximate confidence intervals for the median. The bounds
of the shaded area are defined by the median +/−1.57∗ IQR/√N, where IQR is the dif-
ference between the first and third quartile and N is the number of observations.
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Preferences of Growth and Value Managers
The box portion of the boxplot represents the first and third quartiles. The median is de-
picted using a line through the center of the box, while the mean is drawn using a symbol.
The shaded region displays approximate confidence intervals for the median. The bounds
of the shaded area are defined by the median +/−1.57∗ IQR/√N, where IQR is the dif-
ference between the first and third quartile and N is the number of observations.
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Table 4.7: Significance Tests
g b
F-Test (variances) 1.462 2.049
(0.415) (0.125)
Levene Test 1.846 6.604
(0.1823) (0.014)
T-Test (means) -1.165 -0.680
(0.126) (0.250)
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Test 133.5 219.5
(0.036) (0.306)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 0.350 0.200
(0.076) (0.348)
The average guidance coefficient estimated for the sample of growth firms is
equal to -0.230, which is greater in absolute terms compared to the corresponding
average for the sample of value firms equal to -0.178. Additionally, the standard
deviation of the estimated guidance of growth firm is lower than the corresponding
statistic in the value sample. These difference indicate that the growth firms guide
on average stronger than value firms and the guiding policies of the growth firms
is more homogenous than the guiding policies of the value firms included in our
sample.
To verify the significance of this result we first apply the F–Test and the Levene
Test to test the null hypothesis that the variances of both samples are homogenous.
Both tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis under a reasonable level
of risk. Thus, we can apply the Student t-test to derive conclusions whether the ob-
served differences in the average estimates of both samples are statistically signifi-
cant. We can reject the null hypothesis that the means of the value and growth sam-
ples of estimates are equal under the risk of 12.6%. We also apply two additional
non–parametric tests to relax the assumption that the differences between the sam-
ples are normally distributed. With the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney statistic we test
whether the locations of the distribution with growth estimates is on the right side of
the distribution with value estimates. We can reject the null hypothesis of identical
distribution functions under the risk of 3.6%. With the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-one-
tailed test we extend the analysis to compare any part of both distributions. We can
reject the null-hypothesis that the distribution of estimates in the growth sample is
not significantly lower than the distribution of estimates in the value sample under
the risk that it is true of 7.59%. Overall, we may conclude that the heterogeneity of
the guiding policies of the firms in the growth and value sample is similar, but most
of the growth firms guide stronger than the value firms.
Differences between value and growth firms are also observed with respect to
the managers’ variance aversion. Comparing the variance of the estimated coeffi-
cients in each group, we find significant differences between the managers’ pref-
erences in the growth and value sample, i.e the group of the growth managers is
more homogeneous than the group of the value managers. These managers have
also a higher aversion to variances in price changes than the value stocks managers.
Though, this difference is not statistically significant according to the applied non–
parametric tests.
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4.8 Discussion
The estimation results presented in the previous section suggest that growth firms
provide stronger guidance to the analysts. In our model, the motivation for their
guiding policy can either be driven by their preferences or by the power of positive
feedback traders increasing the variance of firm’s price changes. We do not observe
significant differences in the preferences of the value and growth managers with
respect to the variance of the firm’s price changes. Thus, the observation that growth
firms’ managers guide stronger than value firms’ managers can be explained with
the stronger demand of positive feedback traders.
Positive feedback traders are expected to be more active in trading growth stocks
because growth stocks are usually more difficult to evaluate since most of their
assets are intangible. To the extent that the value and profitability of firm’s assets
is uncertain, investors trading the shares of the firm would be more willing to base
their decisions on previous prices than on earnings forecasts of the analysts. This
is, the future market price of the firm would be dominated by the expectations of
the positive feedback traders and the impact of the fundamental investors would be
limited. This motivates variance-averse managers to intervene against the positive
feedback traders by providing stronger guidance to the analysts that in turn influence
the expectations of the fundamental traders.
The managerial guidance has a significant impact on the precision and efficiency
of analysts’ forecasts. Our first result in section 4.4 states that the stronger the pro-
vided guidance the smaller is the analysts’ forecast error, given that the current price
grows in the opposite direction as the earnings drift, ceteris paribus. For example, if
the current price decreases (increases) although the firm’s earnings tend to increase
(decrease), the manager’s guidance increases the precision of the analysts’ fore-
casts, see equation (4.12). We can use this result in the context of our estimations
to derive a proposition on the relative impact of guidance on the forecast errors of
analysts following value and growth stocks. If we assume that the earnings of value
and growth stocks have both either a positive or a negative drift, we propose that the
forecast errors of the analysts following growth firms should be lower than the fore-
cast errors of the analysts following value firms since according to our estimates,
growth managers guide stronger than value managers. Doukas, Kim and Penzalis
(2002) provide empirical evidence supporting our proposition.
The estimated differences in the guiding policies of value and growth managers
have additional implications for the efficiency of analysts’ forecasts as stated in our
second result in section 4.4. In a bull (bear) market when earnings drift and current
price changes are positive (negative), stronger guidance means also a higher degree
of autocorrelation of subsequent forecast errors, see equation (4.16). Hence, we can
expect that the inefficiency of forecasts observed in the empirical literature would be
more pronounced for analysts following growth firms than for analysts estimating
the earnings of value firms. Testing this proposition is a subject of further research.
4.9 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the guiding policy of different managers as the solution
of an optimal control problem, in which managers minimize the variance of their
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firms’ price changes. We use our model to derive conclusions on the properties of
analysts’ forecasts errors. In particular, we show that optimal guidance may explain
why analysts’ forecast errors are correlated with previous forecast errors or with
past observations of the firm’s performance as observed by other empirical stud-
ies. A common explanation for the observed inefficiency is that analysts underreact
to new information. In our model, the inefficiency occurs as a response to guid-
ance provided by managers minimizing the uncertainty in the firm’s market prices.
According to our model, the stronger the guidance provided by the manager, the
stronger is the autocorrelation of the analysts’ forecast errors.
The manager’s guiding policy and its implications for the analysts’ forecast er-
rors are analyzed in a linear dynamic system with control. We assume that the
price of firm’s shares is basically determined by positive feedback traders increas-
ing the variance of firm’s price changes and fundamental investors following the
forecasts of the analysts. To minimize the variance of firm’s price changes, the
firm’s manager guides the earnings expectations of the analysts following the firm.
The parameters of the manager’s objective function, the state equation governing
the price changes and the feedback rule are recovered simultaneously by using the
GME estimating procedure. The results suggest that the managers of growth firms
provide stronger guidance to the analysts than the managers of value firms since the
market price of growth firms is more likely to be determined by positive feedback
traders than by fundamental investors. Using this result in the context of our model,
we propose that contrary to the error-in-expectations hypothesis analysts follow-
ing growth stocks should have more precise forecasts than analysts following value
stocks. However, we expect that due to the differences in the optimal guiding poli-
cies of value and growth firms, the forecast errors of the analysts following growth
firms will exhibit stronger autocorrelation than the forecast errors of the analysts
following value firms. Since the analysts operate in an economy with managers
aiming to reduce the volatility in the their firm’s price deviations, we may conclude
that the observed autocorrelation is desirable and thus rational.
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The non-linear function defined in equation (2.4) is visualized in the following fig-
ures.
0.8
0.4
0
1
0.6
0.2
x
1E65E50E0-1E6 -5E5
1
0.6
0.8
0.4
0
0.2
y
1E65E50E0-5E5-1E6
The function is plotted for values a= 0, b= 0.00001 (on the left side) and a= 0,
b= 0.0001 (on the right site) and X ∈ [−1′000′000;1′000′000] as a reasonable range
for the reported profits. Larger values of b reduce the interval, where the function
takes value between zero and one. The function becomes similar to the indicator
function.
The first derivative of the function is:
g′(x) =
bexp(−bx)
(1+ exp(−bx))2 (A.1)
It is increasing for x < 0 and decreasing for x > 0 as represented in the figure
below (with a = 0 and b = 0.0001). This is equivalent to the assumption that the
marginal returns of R&D investments are increasing for firms with negative profits
and decreasing for firms with positive profits. This is plausible, since the pressure
of firms with negative earnings to cut costs is stronger than of firms with positive
profits, so that these firms have to be more careful in selecting their R&D project,
which would increase the probability of success.
73
Chapter A Appendix A
2.5E-6
1.5E-6
2E-6
1E-6
0E0
5E-7
x
1E65E50E0-5E5-1E6
The parameter a is a shift parameter. It determines the position of the curve
along the x-axis. For example. for a = 2 and b = 0.00001 respectively b = 0.0001,
the curves look as follows.
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The first derivative is then:
g′(x) =
bexp(a−bx)
(1+ exp(a−bx))2 (A.2)
or graphically:
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B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The optimal forecasts of the analysts given their payoff function (3.7) are:
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+ pn∗+(1− p)n∗ (B.1)
and
F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−µn∗− (1−µ)n∗ (B.2)
Then, the manager’s payoff given that xt = x is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x)−δn] (B.3)
+δθp(x−m)+δθ(1− p)(x−m)
and given that xt = x is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x)−δn] (B.4)
+δθp(x−m)+δθ(1− p)8x−m)
Since the manager’s payoff is increasing in m respectively m, the manager would
choose the extreme strategies m = m = mmax (respectively m = m = mmin). If the
manager is indifferent between manipulating earnings or truthful reporting, we as-
sume that she chooses m = m = 0.
Comparing the manager’s payoff associated with the different strategies we get
that the manager’s payoff is maximal if
m = m = mmax > 0 and θ <
1
1+δ
(B.5)
or
m = m = mmin < 0 and θ >
1
1+δ
(B.6)
If θ = 11+δ , the manager is indifferent between manipulating the earnings and truth-
ful reporting. The analysts’ beliefs are correct and given these beliefs the manager
does not have incentives to follow a different strategy, i.e. m = n = m = n = 0.
If the manager prefers to manipulate the earnings, the analysts adjust their
beliefs accordingly, so that in equilibrium m = m = n = n = mmin respectively
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m=m= n= n=mmax for any µ∈ [0,1]. If for example n= n=mmax, the manager’s
payoffs in both states are:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)] (B.7)
+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1− p)[x−m]
respectively
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)] (B.8)
+δθp(x−m)+δθ(1− p)(x−m)
Then, the manager would compare her payoffs from different manipulation
strategies m ∈ [mmin,mmax] and would choose the strategy delivering the maximum
payoff. If the analysts choose n = n = mmax the manager’s payoff is maximal if
she plays m = m = mmax given that θ < 11+δ . Similarly, the manager’s payoff from
following the strategy m = m = mmin given that the analysts choose n = n = mmin is
maximal if θ > 11+δ . If θ =
1
1+δ , the manager is indifferent between manipulating
earnings and truthful reporting and she chooses m = m = 0.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that in this equilibrium the best response of the analysts is F∗t = F∗t+1 =
px+(1− p)x. Later on, we are proving this claim.
Given the beliefs of the analysts, the payoffs of the manager in both states are:
uM(.) = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x)+ v(x+m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)] (B.9)
respectively
uM(.) = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x)+ v(x+m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)] (B.10)
Now, we consider different levels of manipulation for which the marginal utility
change and compare the manager’s payoffs associated with them. For F∗t = F∗t+1 =
px+(1− p)x the manipulation decisions changing the marginal utility of manipu-
lation are:
m1 = mmin (B.11)
m2 = x− px− (1− p)x =−p(x− x)
m3 = px+(1− p)x− x =−(1− p)(x− x)
m4 = 0
m5 = x− px− (1− p)x = (1− p)(x− x)
m6 = mmax
(B.12)
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respectively
m1 = mmin (B.13)
m2 = x− px− (1− p)x =−p(x− x)
m3 = 0
m4 = x− px− (1− p)x = (1− p)(x− x)
m5 = px− (1− p)x− x = p(x− x)
m6 = mmax
(B.14)
Thus, to prove that the manipulation strategies m3 = −(1− p)(x− x) and m5 =
p(x− x) are the best given that F∗t = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x we need to prove that
the manager cannot increase her payoff by following a different strategy given the
beliefs of the analysts. To define the conditions for which this is true, we compare
the manager’s payoffs associated with the different manipulation strategies.
Consider first the case where xt = x. Then, the manager’s payoffs associated
with the manipulation strategies changing the marginal utility of manipulation in
this state are:
uM1 (m = mmin) = (1−θ)[x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+β(x+mmin− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x]
(B.15)
uM2 (m =−p(x− x)) = (1−θ)[x− p(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x+ p(x− x)+ x+ p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)(x+ p(x− x))
(B.16)
uM3 (m =−(1− p)(x− x)) = (1−θ)[x− (1− p)(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)]
+δθp[x+(1− p)(x− x)
+x+(1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x+(1− p)(x− x)
+β(x+(1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.17)
uM4 (m = 0) = (1−θ)[x+δ(px+(1− p)x)+ x− px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x+ x− px− (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x+β(x− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.18)
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uM5 (m = (1− p)(x− x)) = (1−θ)[x+(1− p)(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+x+(1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x− (1− p)(x− x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x− (1− p)(x− x)
+β(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.19)
uM6 (m = mmax) = (1−θ)[x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+x+mmax− px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x−mmax+β(x−mmax− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax+β(x−mmax− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.20)
The strategy m3 = −(1− p)(x− x) is optimal for the managers if (B.17) is larger
than (B.15), (B.16), (B.18), (B.19) and (B.20). We derive conditions on θ depending
on the parameters p, δ and β for which this is true. These conditions are illustrated
in Figure B.1 as manifolds under the assumption that δ = 0.95 and mmax = 2x.
Figure B.1: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The two-dimensional manifolds determine the subsets of parame-
ters for which certain payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters
under the top manifold are such that (B.17) is greater than (B.15).
The subset of parameters under the middle manifold are such that
(B.17) is greater than (B.16). The subset of parameters above the
lowest manifold are such that (B.17) is greater than (B.18), (B.19)
and (B.20).
Thus, the upper bound of the parameter θ is determined by the condition that
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(B.17) is lower than (B.16) and the lower bound of the parameter θ is determined by
the condition that (B.17) is greater than (B.18). This is equivalent to the condition
2
2+δ(1+ p)+δβ(1− p) ≤ θ≤
1+β
(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) (B.21)
Consider next the case, where xt = x. Then, the manager’s payoffs associated
with the manipulation strategies in this state are:
uM1 (m = mmin) = (1−θ)[x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+β(x+mmin− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)(x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x)
(B.22)
uM2 (m =−p(x− x)) = (1−θ)[x− p(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x+ p(x− x)+ x+ p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x+ p(x− x)]
(B.23)
uM3 (m = 0) = (1−θ)[x+δ(px+(1− p)x)+β(x− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x+ x− px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)[x+β(x− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.24)
uM4 (m = (1− p)(x− x)) = (1−θ)[x+(1− p)(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+β(x+(1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x− (1− p)(x− x)+ x]
+δθ(1− p)[x− (1− p)(x− x)
+β(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.25)
uM5 (m = p(x− x)) = (1−θ)[x+ p(x− x)+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+δθp[x− p(x− x)+β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x− p(x− x)]
+δθ(1− p)[β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(B.26)
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uM6 (m = mmax) = (1−θ)[x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x)
+x+mmax− px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x−mmax+β(x−mmax− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax− px− (1− p)x]
(B.27)
The strategy m5 = p(x− x) is optimal for the manager if (B.26) is larger than
(B.22), (B.23), (B.24), (B.25) and (B.27). We derive conditions on θ depending on
the parameters p, δ and β for which this is true. These conditions are illustrated in
Figure B.2 as manifolds under the assumption that δ = 0.95 and mmax = 2x.
Figure B.2: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
1
20
1
0.2
0.9
0.4
3 beta
0.6
0.8
theta
0.8
0.7 4
1
p 0.6 50.5
The two-dimensional manifolds determine the subsets of parameters
for which certain payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters under the
top manifold are such that (B.26) is greater than (B.22). The subset of
parameters under the middle manifold are such that (B.26) is greater
than (B.23), (B.24) and (B.25). The subset of parameters above the
lowest manifold are such that (B.26) is greater than (B.27).
Thus, the strategy m5 = p(x− x) is optimal for the manager if (B.26) is larger
than (B.24) and (B.27). This is true for
−2(mmax− p(x− x))
2p+δp(1+β)−mmax(2+δ(1+β)) ≤ θ≤
1
1+δ
(B.28)
If mmax = x− x for example, then the condition is equivalent to:
2
2+δ(1+β)
≤ θ≤ 1
1+δ
(B.29)
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Comparing the conditions (B.21) and (B.29), one can see that the lower bound
for the parameter θ is determined by condition (B.21) and the upper bound for the
parameter θ is determined by condition (B.29) so that for 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) ≤ θ ≤
1
1+δ the best strategy of the manager is to cover the consensus forecast, which is
equal to the mean of the ”true” earnings in this equilibrium.
Note that this strategy is optimal only if investors are loss averse. For β≤ 1 the
conditions (B.21) and (B.29) are empty and the non–revealing equilibrium where
the manager manipulates earnings to meet the consensus forecast would not exist.
Finally, we prove that given the best response of the manager, the best forecasts
of the analysts is Ft = F t+1 = F t+1 = px+(1− p)x. The optimal forecasts of the
analysts given their payoff function (3.7) and the optimal manipulation decision of
the manager are:
F∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1
= px+(1− p)x+ p(1− p)(x− x)+(1− p)p(x− x)
= px+(1− p)x
(B.30)
since in this equilibrium µ = p.
The optimal reporting strategy of the manager given that Ft = Ft+1 = px+(1−
p)x is summarized graphically using a numerical example with x = 1, x = −1,
p = 0.6, δ = 0.95.
Figure B.3: Optimal Reporting if xt = x and xt = x
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The figure summarizes the optimal reported earnings ”D up” equal to
Dt = x+m and ”D down” equal to Dt = x+m given that Ft = Ft+1 =
px+(1− p)x. The manager’s optimal reporting is calculated for x = 1,
x =−1, β = 5, p = 0.6, δ = 0.95.
As one can easily see, the optimal manipulation strategy where Dt = Dt results
only for particular values of θ. the upper and lower bound for θ are calculated
above. For other values of θ Dt is not equal to Dt , so that the reporting is revealing
in the sense that the analysts would adjust their beliefs in equilibrium. The chosen
reporting might not be optimal anymore.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose that in the first equilibrium the best response of the analysts is Ft = px+
(1− p)x+mmax and F t+1 = F t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax. later on, we are proving
this claim.
Given the beliefs of the analysts, the manager’s payoffs are:
uM(.) = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)]
+(1−θ)[v(x+m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
(B.31)
respectively
uM(.) = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)]
+(1−θ)[v(x+m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
(B.32)
Now, we consider different levels of manipulation for which the marginal utility
of manipulation changes and compare the manager’s payoff associated with them.
Given the analysts’ forecasts representing the reference point in the function v(.)
the feasible manipulation levels m ∈ [mmin,mmax] for which the marginal utility of
manipulation changes are:
m = mmax− x+ px+(1− p)x (B.33)
m = mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x
m = mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x
Note that given the analysts’ forecasts, the manager is able to meet them in
the current period only if xt = x. If xt = x, the manipulation required to meet the
consensus forecast is not feasible since we assume that m ∈ [mmin,mmax].
Overall, the manager can chose among the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = 0
m3 = mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x
m4 = mmax− x+ px+(1− p)x
m5 = mmax
respectively
m1 = mmin
m2 = 0
m3 = mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x
m4 = mmax
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Consider first the case where xt = x. The manager’s payoffs associated with the
manipulation strategies listed above are as follows.
uM1 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)
+β(x+mmin− px− (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
(B.34)
uM2 (.) = (1−θ)[x+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)
+β(x− px− (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmax] (B.35)
uM3 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)
+β(x+mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x−mmax− x+ px+(1− p)x
+x−mmax− x+ px+(1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax− x+ px+(1− p)x] (B.36)
uM4 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmax− x+ px+(1− p)x+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x−mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x
+x−mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x
+β(x−mmax+ x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
(B.37)
uM5 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmax)
+x+mmax− px− (1− p)x−mmax]
+δθp[x−mmax+ x−mmax− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax+β(x−mmax− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
(B.38)
The strategy m5 = mmax is optimal for the manager if (B.38) is larger than (B.34),
(B.35), (B.36) and (B.37). We derive conditions on θ depending on the parameters
85
Chapter B Appendix B
p, δ and β for which this is true and represent them as manifolds in the following
figure.
Figure B.4: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The two-dimensional manifolds determine the subsets of parameters
for which certain payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters under
the top manifold is such that (B.38) is larger than (B.36). The subset
of parameters under the next two manifolds is such that (B.38) is larger
than (B.34) respectively (B.35). The subset of parameters under the last
manifold is such that (B.38) is larger than (B.37).
As one can easily see in the figure above only condition (B.37) is binding so that
the upper bound is determined by the condition that (B.38) is larger than (B.37).
This is true for θ ∈ [0, 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p)).
The condition on θ for which the manager follows m=mmax achieve the highest
utility is not binding.
Suppose now that the best forecasts of the analysts in the second equilibrium are
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+mmin and F∗t+1 = F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin. Later on, we
are proving this.
Given the analysts’ forecasts, the manager can chose between the following
strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = mmin+ x− px− (1− p)x
m3 = mmin− x+ px+(1− p)x
m4 = 0
m5 = mmax
respectively
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m1 = mmin
m2 = mmin+ x− px− (1− p)x
m3 = 0
m4 = mmax
Consider first the case where xt = x. The payoffs from following the strategies
m1 to m5 are the following:
uM1 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmin+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)
+β(x+mmin− px− (1− p)x−mmin)]
+δθp[x−mmin+ x−mmin− px− (1− p)x+mmin]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin+β(x−mmin− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
(B.39)
uM2 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmin+ x− px− (1− p)x+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)
+β(x+mmin+ x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x−mmin)]
+δθp[x−mmin− x+ px+(1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin− x+ px+(1− p)x
+β(x−mmin− x+ px+(1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
(B.40)
uM3 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmin− x+ px+(1− p)x+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)]
+δθp[x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmin
+β(x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmin− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−+x− px− (1− p)x+mmin
+β(x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmin− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
(B.41)
uM4 (.) = (1−θ)[x+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)
+x− px− (1− p)x−mmin]
+δθp[x+β(x− px− (1− p)x+mmin]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin+β(x− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
(B.42)
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uM5 (.) = (1−θ)[x+mmax+δ(px+(1− p)x−mmin)
+x+mmax− px− (1− p)x−mmin]
+δθp[x−mmax+β(x−mmax− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax+β(x−mmax− px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
(B.43)
The strategy m = mmin is optimal for the manager, if the payoff (B.39) is larger
than the payoffs (B.40), (B.41), (B.42) and (B.43). We derive conditions on θ de-
pending on the parameters p, β and δ for which this is true and illustrate them in the
following figure.
Figure B.5: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which certain
payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters above the lowest manifold
is such that (B.39) is larger than (B.43). The subset of parameters above
the next two manifolds is such that (B.39) is larger than (B.42) respec-
tively (B.41). The subset of parameters above the manifolds on the top
is such that (B.39) is larger than (B.40).
As one can easily see in the figure above, the lower bound for the parameter θ
is determined by the condition that (B.39) is larger than (B.40), which is true for
θ ∈ ( 1+β(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) ,1].
The manager’s payoff is maximal if she decides to manipulate earnings down to
m = mmin if (B.39) is larger than (B.40). If this condition is satisfied, the manager
would chose m = mmin.
Given the manager’s strategy m=m=mmin respectively m=m=mmax the best
response of the analysts minimizing the squared mean forecast error as defined in
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(3.7) is:
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+ pn∗+(1− p)n∗ = px+(1− p)x+mmin (B.44)
respectively
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+ pn∗+(1− p)n∗ = px+(1− p)x+mmax (B.45)
and
F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x+µn∗+(1−µ)n∗ = px+(1− p)x−mmin (B.46)
respectively
F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x+µn∗+(1−µ)n∗ = px+(1− p)x−mmax (B.47)
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
If v(.) = 0, the manager’s payoffs in both states are:
uM(.) = (1−θ)max(x+m+δFt+1−X ,0)
+δθpmax(x−m−X ,0)
+δθ(1− p)max(x−m−X ,0) (B.48)
respectively
uM(.) = (1−θ)max(x+m+δFt+1−X ,0)
+δθpmax(x−m−X ,0)
+δθ(1− p)max(x−m−X ,0) (B.49)
where X := px+(1− p)x.
Consider first the case xt = x where the manager aims to find some m∈ [mmin,mmax]
that maximizes (B.48) given Ft+1. Suppose that in this equilibrium F∗t+1 = X =
px+(1− p)x. Then, the manager’s marginal utility would change when the man-
ager switches between the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = px+(1− p)x− x
m4 = X−δ(x+(1− p)x)− x
m5 = 0
m6 = x−X
m7 = mmax
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The value of the call options in period t and t+1 associated with these strategies is
given in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 δX 2(1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 0 2(1− p)(x− x)+δX 0
m5 (1− p)(x− x)+δX (1− p)(x− x) 0
m6 2(1− p)(x− x)+δX 0 0
m7 (1− p)(x− x)+δX +mmax 0 0
The strategies m3 and m5, which are consistent with the analysts’ expectations
are both dominated strategies. Thus, given the analysts’ beliefs Ft+1 = X = px+
(1− p)x, the manager is always better off if she deviates from the strategy consistent
with these beliefs. In particular, the manager’s utility is maximal if she follow either
strategy m1 = mmin or strategy m7 = mmax in dependance on the parameter of the
utility function, i.e. δ and θ.
Consider next the case xt = x where the manager aims to find some m∈ [mmin,mmax]
that maximizes (B.49) given Ft+1 = X = px+(1− p)x. Then, the manager’s utility
would change when the manager switches between the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = 0
m4 = x−X
m5 = X −δ(px+(1− p)x)− x
m6 = px+(1− p)x− x
m7 = mmax
The value of the call options in period t and t+1 associated with these strategies is
given in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 0 (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 0 0 0
m5 0 0 0
m6 δX 0 0
m7 −p(x− x)+δX +mmax 0 0
Thus, the strategies m6 and m3 consistent with the analysts’ beliefs are both
dominated strategies. Thus, given the analysts’ beliefs Ft+1 = X = px+(1− p)x,
the manager is always better if she deviate from the strategies consistent with these
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beliefs. In particular, the manager’s utility is maximal if she follows either strategy
m1 = mmin or strategy m7 = mmax in dependance on the parameter δ and θ.
If the manager chooses to play m = m = mmin or m = m = mmax the analysts
would change their beliefs in equilibrium so that Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin re-
spectively Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax.
Consider first the case where Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin. This is an equilibrium
strategy if the manager prefers to play m = m = mmin to any other strategy. In order
to derive conditions for which this is true we evaluate the value of the stock options
in both periods associated with the different manipulation strategies available to the
manager given that Ft+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin. The strategies available to the
manager are:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = 0
m4 = x−X
m5 = mmax
respectively
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = 0
m4 = x−X
m5 = mmax
The following table summarizes the value of the stock options in both periods
associated with these strategies.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 x−X +mmin+δ(X −mmin) (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 (1−2p)(x− x)+δ(X −mmin) x− x 0
m3 x−X +δ(X −mmin) (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 2(1− p)(x− x)+δ(X −mmin) 0 0
m5 x−X +mmax+δ(X −mmin) 0 0
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 −p(x− x)+δ(X−mmin) (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 (1−2p)(x− x)+δ(X −mmin) 0 0
m5 −p(x− x)+mmax+δ(X−mmin) 0 0
where X := px+(1− p)x. The next figure illustrates for which parameters θ, p,
and δ the manager’s payoff is maximal if she chooses the strategy m1 = mmin.
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Figure B.6: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x given that Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin
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The manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which certain
payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters above the lowest manifold
is such that uM(m1)> uM(m2). The subset of parameters above the next
two manifolds is such that uM(m1) > uM(m3) and uM(m1) > uM(m4).
The subset of parameters above the manifolds on the top is such that
uM(m1)> uM(m5).
Thus, given that Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin the manager chooses m = mmin if
uM(m1)> uM(m5), which is true for
θ >
2
2+δ
(B.50)
If condition (B.50) holds, the manager would also choose m1 = mmin since
uM(m1)> u
M(m) for any p∈ [0,1] and δ∈ [0,1]. This is illustrated in the following
figure.
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Figure B.7: Restrictions on θ for which uM(m1) > uM(m5) and uM(m1) > uM(m5)
given that Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmin
1
00 0.9
0.2
0.2 0.8
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.7 p
0.8
0.6delta 0.6
1
0.8
0.51
The manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which certain
payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters above the lowest manifold
is such that uM(m1) is maximal. The subset of parameters above the
manifolds on the top is such that uM(m1) is maximal.
Consider now the case where Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax. The manager can
choose between the same manipulation strategies as in the case where Ft+1 = px+
(1− p)x−mmin. The value of her stock options changes as follows.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 −p(x− x)+δ(X−mmax) (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 2(1− p)(x− x)+δ(X−mmax) 0 0
m5 (1− p)(x− x)+δ(X−mmax)+mmax 0 0
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 0 (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 0 0 0
m5 −p(x− x)+mmax+δ(X−mmax) 0 0
for δ < 2(p−1)2p−3 .
Thus, the manager chooses m = mmax but also m = mmax if uM(m5) > u
M(m1).
This is true for
θ <
2(1− p)+δ(2p−3)
2(1− p)+δ(2p−1) (B.51)
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B.5 Proof of Theorem 5
If v(.) 6= 0 the manager’s payoffs in both states are:
uM(.) = (1−θ)max[x+m+δF t+1+ v(x+m−Ft)−X ,0]
δθpmax[x−m+ v(x−m−F t+1)−X ,0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m+ v(x−m−F t+1)−X ,0]
(B.52)
and
uM(.) = (1−θ)max[x+m+δF t+1+ v(x+m−Ft)−X ,0]
δθpmax[x−m+ v(x−m−F t+1)−X ,0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m+ v(x−m−F t+1)−X ,0]
(B.53)
where the function v(.) is defined as in (3.3) and X := px+(1− p)x as before.
Consider first the case where the manager aims to find some m ∈ [mmin,mmax]
that maximizes (B.52) given F t+1. Suppose that in equilibrium F
∗
t+1 = X = px+
(1− p)x. Then, the manager’s marginal utility would change when the manager
switches between the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X =−p(x− x)
m3 = X − x =−(1− p)(x− x)
m4 = 0
m5 = x−X = (1− p)(x− x)
m6 = mmax (B.54)
The value of the stock options in both periods associated with these strategies
are given in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 2(1− p)(x− x)−2mmin −2p(x− x)−2mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 2(1− p)(x− x)+δX 2(1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 δX 3(1− p)(x− x)+ x 0
m5 4(1− p)(x− x)+δX 0 0
m6 2(1− p)(x− x)+2mmax+δX 0 0
Thus, given that Ft = F t+1 = X = px−+(1− p)x for any θ ∈ [0,1] the strate-
gies m3 and m4, which are consistent with the analysts’ forecasts are dominated.
Moreover, if the analysts forecasts are Ft = F t+1 = X = px+(1− p)x, the manager
chooses either m1 = mmin or m6 = mmax. Thus, in equilibrium the analysts would
change their beliefs.
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Suppose that the analysts best forecasts are Ft = X +mmin and F t+1 = X−mmin.
Then, the manager can choose among the following manipulation strategies:
m1 = mmin (B.55)
m2 = x−X +mmin = (1− p)(x− x)+mmin
m3 = 0
m4 = mmax
The value of the stock options in both periods associated with these strategies is
summarized in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 2(1− p)(x− x)+δX +(1−δ)mmin 2(1− p)(x− x)−mmin 0
m2 4(1− p)(x− x)+δX +(1−δ)mmin −mmin 0
m3 2(1− p)(x− x)+δX− (1+δ)mmin 0 0
m4 2(1− p)(x− x)+δX− (3+δ)mmin 0 0
The strategies m2 and m3 are dominated by m4 for any θ ∈ [0,1]. Thus, given
Ft = X +mmin and F t+1 = X−mmin, the strategy m1 = mmin is an equilibrium strat-
egy if uM(m1)≥ uM(m4). This is true for
θ≥ 4
4+3δp−2δp2 (B.56)
If xt = x the manager can choose among the following manipulation strategies:
m1 = mmin (B.57)
m2 = x−X +mmin = (1− p)(x− x)+mmin
m3 = X − x+mmin = p(x− x)+mmin
m4 = 0
m5 = mmax
The value of the stock options in both periods associated with these strategies is
summarized in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 2(1− p)(x− x)−mmin 0
m2 0 −mmin 0
m3 δX +(1−δ)mmin 0 0
m4 δX − p(x− x)− (1+δ)mmin 0 0
m5 δX −2p(x− x)+(3+δ)mmax 0 0
for β > 2(1−p)2p−1 .
The strategy m1 = mmin would be an equilibrium strategy of the manager if
uM(m1) is the maximum utility the manager can achieve given the forecasts of the
analysts. Since the strategies m4 and m3 are dominated by m5 and the strategy m2
is dominated by m1 the strategy m1 is the best if u
M(m1)> u
M(m5) which is equiv-
alent to θ > Ct(m5)δpCt+1(m1)+Ct(m5)
. Recall that the condition (B.56) is equivalent to θ >
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Ct(m5)−Ct(m1)
δpCt+1(m1)+Ct(m5)−Ct(m1) . Thus, if (B.56) holds, the condition θ >
Ct(m5)
δpCt+1(m1)+Ct(m5)
would not be binding since Ct(m5)<Ct(m5).
Suppose now that the analysts’ best forecasts are F = px+(1− p)x+mmax and
Ft+1 = px+(1− p)x−mmax. This is an equilibrium strategy, if the manager would
play m = m = mmax. However, if investors are loss averse, i.e. β > 1, the manager
would never play m = mmax, since this is a dominated strategy. This is because
Ct(m = mmax) > 0 only if β <
(1−δ)(X−mmax)−x
x−X . This condition is greater than 1
only if δ < mmax−2(X−xmmax−X , which is negative if we assume that mmax = x− x. Thus,
if investors are loss averse, i.e. β > 1, the manager would never choose to play
m = mmax in equilibrium given that the analysts expect them to do so. Thus, this
strategy is not part of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).
B.6 Proof of Theorem 6
The optimal forecasts of the guided analysts given their payoff function (3.7) with
n = m and n = m are:
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+ pm+(1− p)m (B.58)
and
F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−µm− (1−µ)m (B.59)
Given the best response of the analysts to the manager providing guidance with
respect to the earnings she are about to shift over time, the manager’s payoff in both
states is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−µm− (1−µ)m)]
+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1− p)[x−m] (B.60)
respectively
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−µm− (1−µ)m)]
+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1− p)[x−m] (B.61)
Since v(.) = 0 the manager’s payoff depends linearly on m respectively m so
that the manager would either choose to play mmax or mmin. If the manager choses
the same action in both states, i.e. m = m ∈ {mmin,mmax}, the outsiders’ beliefs µ
do not matter and the manager’s payoff is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−m]
+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1− p)[x−m] (B.62)
respectively
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−m)]
+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1− p)[x−m] (B.63)
96
The manager would therefore prefer to manipulate the earnings rather than to
report truthfully if either
θ < 1−δ and m = mmax > 0 (B.64)
or
θ > 1−δ and m = mmin < 0 (B.65)
If θ = 1−δ, the manager is indifferent between earnings manipulation and truthful
reporting. However, if the manager says that she is not going to manipulate the
earnings and the analysts expect them to do so, they have strong incentives to deviate
from the announced strategy. Thus, truthful reporting is not an equilibrium strategy
for the manager guiding the analysts. Hence, a manager with θ = 1− δ, would
decide to manipulate earnings up, i.e. m = m = mmax, since 1− δ < 11+δ for any
0 < δ≤ 1 and m = m = mmax is the optimal strategy of the manager with θ < 11+δ .
B.7 Proof of Theorem 7
The optimal forecasts of the analysts given their payoff function (3.7) with n = m
and n = m are:
F∗t = px+(1− p)x+ pm+(1− p)m (B.66)
F∗t+1 = px+(1− p)x−µm− (1−µ)m (B.67)
Given the best response of the analysts to the manager guidance, the manager’s
payoffs are:
uM(.) = (1−θ)max[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−µm− (1−µ)m)−X ;0]
+δθpmax[x−m−X ;0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m−X ;0] (B.68)
respectively
uM(.) = (1−θ)max[x+m+δ(px+(1− p)x−µm− (1−µ)m)−X ;0]
+δθpmax[x−m−X ;0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m−X ;0] (B.69)
To determine the manager’s optimal manipulation strategy while considering its im-
pact on the best response of the analysts we consider different strategies. Given the
manager’s payoffs there are three reasonable candidates in both states, i.e. m1 =
m1 = mmin, m2 = m2 = 0, or m3 = m3 = mmax. If xt = x, the manager’s call options
have the following values:
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 (1− p)(x− x)+δX (1− p)(x− x) 0
m3 (1− p)(x− x)+(1−δ)mmax+δX 0 0
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Thus, the strategy m2 = 0 is a dominated strategy for any θ∈ [0,1]. The manager
chooses m1 = mmin if uM(m1)> uM(m3), which is true for
θ >
(2− p−δ)(x− x)+δX
(2− p)(x− x)+δX (B.70)
Thus, if θ ∈ [0, (2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX(2−p)(x−x)+δX ] the manager chooses m3 = mmax. If xt = x the
manager’s call options have the following values.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 (1− p)(x− x) 0
m3 −p(x− x)+mmax(1−δ)+δX 0 0
for δ < 2p−22p−3
The manager chooses the strategy m3 =mmax if θ<
Ct(m3)
Ct(m3)−δmmin , which is equiv-
alent to the condition (B.51).
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To calibrate the model, we first need to reformulate the unknown parameters sum-
marized in the vector β and noise terms summarized in the vector e so that they
have the properties of probabilities. In particular, we treat each of the unknowns as
a random variable with a compact support and 2 ≤ M ≤ ∞ respectively 2 ≤ J ≤ ∞
possible outcomes. Let the vector z = z1, ...,zM be a set of M points spanning the
possible unknown value of the vector of parameters β and the vector v= v1, ...,vJ be
a set of J points spanning the possible values of the vector of noise terms ε. Then,
each of the k parameters can be written as
βk =
M
∑
m=1
pkmz
k
m (C.1)
and each of the n noise terms can be written as
en =
J
∑
j=1
wnjv
n
j (C.2)
with ∑Mm=1 pmk = 1 and ∑
J
j=1 w
j
n = 1. The estimation problem is to recover the prob-
ability distributions for the unknown parameters and error terms that reconcile the
available prior information with the observed sample information.
Using the reparameterized unknowns and the steady–state conditions of the
linear-quadratic control problem we propose a GME solution to the problem that
selects the probabilities pk with k = a,b,c,g,h where h is a Lagrange multiplier and
wn with n = ε1,ε2 to maximize
H(pk,wn) =−∑
k
∑
M
pkm ln(p
k
m)−∑
n
∑
J
wnj ln(w
n
j) (C.3)
subject to
yt =
M
∑
m=1
pamz
a
myt−1+Gt +
J
∑
j=1
wε1j v
ε1
j (C.4)
Gt =
M
∑
m=1
pgmz
g
myt−1+
J
∑
j=1
wε2j v
ε2
j (C.5)
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where yt = pt − pt−1,
M
∑
m=1
pgmz
g
m =−
M
∑
m=1
pamz
a
m/
M
∑
m=1
pcmz
c
m (C.6)
M
∑
m=1
pbmz
b
m =−
M
∑
m=1
phmz
h
m+δ(
M
∑
m=1
pamz
a
m+
M
∑
m=1
pcmz
c
m
M
∑
m=1
pgmz
g
m)
2
M
∑
m=1
phmz
h
m (C.7)
M
∑
m=1
pmk = 1 where k = a,b,c,g,h (C.8)
J
∑
j=1
wJn = 1 where n = ε1,ε2 (C.9)
Here, the objective function is the Shannon entropy (1948) of the distribution of
probabilities. Equations (C.4), (C.5) together with the reparameterized steady–state
conditions of the control problem (C.6) and (C.7) represent consistency relations.
Equations (C.8) and (C.9) are additivity or normalization constraints.
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